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Recent events have brought to the fore the role of third state reme-
dies under international law. In its Judgment on the Merits in the Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") considered whether the
United States had the unilateral right to use force in response to Nica-
ragua's actions against other Central American States.' The Court
held that the United States had no such unilateral right.2 The ICJ,
however, allowed that third states may have the right to take counter-
measures under some circumstances. 3
In the Persian Gulf, the war between Iran and Iraq threatened the
safety of neutral shipping. United Nations assistance was sought in
response,4 and some neutral states deployed armed forces to protect
their flag vessels from illegal attacks by the belligerents. Initially these
forces were not authorized to protect other states' vessels. Neverthe-
less, the policy objectives of these neutral states included the protec-
tion of the freedoms of navigation for vessels of all flags.' When the
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1. Military & Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 106-11, 119-21, 127 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case, Merits].
2. Id. at 146-49.
3. Id. at 127. See id., Dissent of Judge Schwebel, at 361-62; see infra notes 88-94 and accom-
panying text.
4. S.C.O.R. Res. 598, 41 U.N. S.C.O.R. (2750th mtg, U.N. Doc S/INF/41 (1987). For re-
newed efforts, see UN. Chief Making New Gulf Effort, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1988 at A12, col. 6.
5. President Reagan stated the following at his news conference of October 22, 1987: "We're
there to protect neutral-nation shipping in international waters that under international law are
[sic] supposed to be open to all traffic." Reagan's News Conference on Domestic and Foreign
Matters, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1987 at A8, col. 1. See also, British Shut Down Iran Arms Office,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1987, at A13, col. 1; French Navy Helps a Foreign Tanker in Gulf,
N.Y..Times, Jan. 21, 1988, at A7, col. I (National Ed.); SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMIT-
TEE, U.S. POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND KUWAITI REFLAGGING, reprinted in U.S. DEPT.
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United Nations efforts produced no relief, the neutral states expanded
their mission beyond the protection of flag vessels. Merchant vessels
were encouraged to sail close to the naval vessels of other flags, which
protected them from hostile actions. Furthermore, threats to flag ves-
sels were construed broadly to permit challenges to vessels suspected
of intending to damage flag vessels even by indirect means.
For example, an Iranian vessel found laying mines in the Gulf was
ordered by a United States naval vessel to cease mining. When the
Iranian vessel refused to do so, it was attacked, captured, and sunk.
6
These actions took place although no United States vessel had been
damaged by the mines laid by that vessel. Nor were United States
vessels immediately at risk. Subsequently, a French naval vessel came
to the aid of a Liberian tanker that was under attack by an Iranian
vessel. Consistent with the French rules of engagement, the French
vessel threatened to fire at the attackers if they failed to desist.7 As a
result of these developments, the United States adopted new rules of
engagement which authorized its naval vessels in the Gulf to defend
neutral ships of any nation under attack by a Persian Gulf belligerent
outside of declared war exclusion zones.
8
The neutral nations that sent armed forces into the Gulf were re-
luctant to assume the role of international policemen enforcing inter-
national law against all violators. Nevertheless, they found that
limitations on their roles were not viable. No objection was made by
other non-belligerents to this broader role which may very well be
consistent with contemporary international law.
Additionally, the international community is concerned with rules
applicable to the world's common spaces. Current interest has fo-
cused upon the management of the Antarctic Continent. It is consid-
ered by many to be outside of the territory of any state. Customary
and conventional law apply to activities in that area. They protect the
Antarctic's fragile environment, maintain its demilitarized status, and
facilitate the freedom of scientific research. 9 It is not clear which
states have standing to enforce these norms. Since violations may not
OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CURRENT POLICY No. 978 (1987)(Statement of
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs).
6. U. S. Reports Firing on Iranian Vessel Seen Laying Mines, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at
Al, col. 6; 26 Iranian Seized Aboard Mine Ship; More U.S. Shooting, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1987,
at At, col. 6 (National Ed.); United States Blows Up Captured Iranian Vessel, N.Y. Times, Sept
26, 1987, at A4, col. 1.
7. French Navy Helps a Foreign Tanker in Gulf supra note 5.
8. Reagan Orders Broader Protection of Commercial Shipping in Gulf N.Y. Times, April 30,
1988, at A6, cols. 1-4.
9. See Bilder, The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctica, in THE NEW NATION-
ALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 167 (J. Charney ed. 1982); and Charney, Future
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directly injure any particular state, enforcement might only be under-
taken by non-injured states or special groups of states.10
Most assume that remedies under international law may be pur-
sued by injured states only. It is far from clear, however, that this
assumption is correct. There is a growing consensus that in some situ-
ations any state, regardless of whether or not it has been injured in fact
by a state's illegal behavior, may have a right to seek remedies under
international law. Third states also may have duties to cooperate with
remedial actions taken by others.
This article explores issues arising from third state enforcement of
international law. Support for third state remedies may be found in
law, practice, and the literature. It is not, however, definitively estab-
lished. Third state remedies may appear at first glance to serve only
the desirable goal of promoting rules of international law, but they
may also produce negative side effects. The challenge to the interna-
tional community is to design an effective third state enforcement re-
gime that minimizes undesirable side effects.
Before proceeding, it is important to make clear that this article
takes a broad approach to the subject. A variety of remedies are avail-
able in response to a violation of international law. The remedies
might be obligatory or discretionary. They include the following:
I. a right to take non-forceful defensive action to protect the state's self
interest;
2. a right to issue communications calling attention to the illegal be-
havior (droit de regard);
3. a right to issue diplomatic protests;
4. a right to bring the matter to a third party for dispute settlement
(locus standi) with the consent of the alleged violator;
5. a right to engage in non-neutral counter-measures alone or in coop-
eration with other states' enforcement actions;
6. a right to engage in retortion;
7. a right to reparations;
8. a right to engage in non-forceful reprisals; and
9. a right to engage in forceful reprisals and/or self-defense.
All of these actions must be considered to comprise the regime of
remedies for violations of international law. While any examination of
third state remedies ought to take account of the entire range of reme-
dies that may be available to third states, primary focus here will be on
the actions that clearly are governed by international law. Reprisals,
Strategies For an Antarctic Mineral Resource Regime - Can the Environment Be Protected?, in
id. at 206.
10. See Charney, The Antarctic System and Customary International Law, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 55 (F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi, eds. 1987) [hereinafter Char-
ney, The Antarctic System].
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self-defense, third party dispute settlement, counter-measures, and
reparations are clearly governed by rules of international law. Diplo-
matic protests, retortion, non-neutral behavior, and droit de regard
taken in response to violations of the law play a particularly important
role in correcting violations of international law and promoting obedi-
ence to the law. While this latter group of actions may not be gov-
erned by international law in many respects, these actions are limited
by rules of international law. Thus, rules govern the neutrality of
states, states are prohibited from intervening in the domestic affairs of
other states, and the law appears to place limits both on the purposes
that may justify such actions and on their severity." I International law
might prohibit the fourth through ninth actions in the absence of legal
injury to the state taking such measures.
It is also true that particular rules govern each of the remedies
identified above. Since the remedies are different, rules guiding their
application must vary. On the other hand, they are all guided by gen-
eral rules of international remedies. Viewed from the perspective of
third state remedies and the general enforcement of international law,
they are linked by law and policy. It is the purpose of this article to
focus upon these linkages and to explore the regime of third state rem-
edies as a whole, while taking necessary account of the differences in-
herent in the variety of actions that are available and the
circumstances in which third state remedies may be found to be
appropriate.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THIRD STATE REMEDIES
A. Pre- World War II
The traditional view is that remedies under public international
law are bilateral and available only to states that have suffered an in-
11. While retortion is defined as an unfriendly, but lawful act, it may violate international
law due to its improper objective or disproportionate application. The Declaration of Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, G.A.Res.
2625, 25 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp.(No.28) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) states: "No State may
use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type of measures to coerce another
State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to
secure from it advantages of any kind." See 0. Schachter, International Law in Theory and
Practice, 178 REC. DES COURS 175, 185-87 (V-1982). The theory of abuse of rights may be
relevant in this regard. See L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 345 (H. Lauterpacht 8th
ed.); E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES 5, 13 (1984) [hereinafter E. ZOLLER,
PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES]. Zoller considers retortion to be in the "grey zone" be-
tween law and non-law. Id. at 15. Meron argues that the right to censure by third states for
violations of human rights norms is established under public international law. Meron, On a
Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-13 (1986) [hereinafter
Meron, On a Hierarchy]. See Riphagen, Fifth Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of




jury to their legal interests. 12 This view is not necessarily correct, nor
may it preclude all third state remedies. One can go back to Hugo
Grotius to find support for the proposition that certain rules of law are
or ought to be enforceable by any state, even in the absence of direct
injuries. 13 Early in this century Elihu Root argued that states engag-
ing in the illegal use of force or taking other actions which constitute
threats to law and order in the international community should be
subject to unilateral remedies by third states. 14 Throughout the his-
tory of international law, a role for third states in the enforcement of
certain rules of international law has been advocated.' 5 Prior to
World War II, some limited state practice in support of third state
rights and duties may also be found.16 Situations of third state reme-
dies have, however, been the exception to the general behavior of
states, which limited the enforcement of international law by tradi-
tional means to states whose legal rights had been damaged directly by
other states. 17
12. South West Africa Cases, (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) Second
Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6, at 32-35 [hereinafter South West Africa Cases, Second Phase]; I. BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 469-72 (1979). Damage does not necessarily give
rise to a violation of legal interests. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (New
Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain) Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 4, at 32, 36 [hereinafter Barce-
lona Case]. Nor is an interest sufficient. South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J., at 34.
13. H. GROTIUs, 2 DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS, 504-06 (F. Kelsey Trans. 1925).
14. Root, The Outlook For International Law, 9 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 2, 5-10 (Dec. 28-
30, 1915).
15. For a review of this history, see Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its Twenty-Eighth Session 3 May-23 July 1976, U.N. Doc. A/31/10, reprinted in 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2, at 111-15 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 ILC Report]; Akehurst, Reprisals by
Third States, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 1, 2 (1970). These histories refer to writings by Vattel,
Fauchille, Oppenheim, Stowell, Westlake, and others.
16. Article 114 of the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and
Aerial War declared a violation of neutrality rights of one neutral State to be a violation of the
neutral rights of all neutral States. The Commentary supporting this article relied upon the
protests by France, Prussia, Austria, and Italy of the United States 1861 seizure of Confederate
agents found on a British vessel located on the high seas. 33 AM. J. INT'L. L. 175, 788-93 (Supp.
1939) [hereinafter Naval and Aerial War]. Third States intervened in 1900 to crush the Boxer
Rebellion, but their disinterested status is not clear. See Akehurst, supra note 15, at 3. Pacific
Blockades in the 1800s by Zanzibar, Greece, Netherlands, and Crete to enforce international law
and promote humanitarian goals have also been relied upon. PAO JIN Ho, PACIFIC BLOCKADE
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS USES AS A MEASURE OF REPRISAL (1925).
In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations was designed to eliminate the use of
force in international relations. Articles 11 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
authorized third states unilaterally to take reprisals against states engaged in the illegal use of
force. Covenant of the League of Nations, June 28, 1919, arts. I I and 16, 1 HUDSON INT'L LEG.
1, 7, 11 (1931). Since the effort has been considered to have been a failure, its precedential value
is questionable. See D. BOWETr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 17 (1982); M.
DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 24-31 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter M. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS]; M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTER-
NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 42-55 (1980) [hereinafter M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS]; E.
ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES, supra note 11, at 38-39; and W. HOGAN, INTER-
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AND THIRD STATES SINCE THE WORLD WAR (1941).
17. Accord, Akehurst, supra note 15, at 3, 14-15; Root, supra note 14, at 7-10.
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The Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") addressed
the question once, but did not clarify the role of third states. Reliance
is often placed upon the Wimbledon case, in which third party mem-
bers of multilateral treaties were allowed to intervene. '8 Germany had
refused to permit navigation in the Kiel Canal by a British vessel
under Charter to a French company. The Applicants, Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Japan, brought suit against Germany on the basis of
a compromissory clause contained in the Treaty of Versailles. The
Applicants claimed the right of navigation was protected by the
Treaty. The Court gave judgment in favor of the Applicants on this
basis and awarded France reparations.1 9 Neither Italy nor Japan al-
leged a pecuniary interest in the suit. The Court sustained their par-
ticipation in the suit based upon their status as parties to the Treaty
and the facts that they possessed fleets and merchant vessels flying
their flags.20 Although Poland obtained intervention in accordance
with the PCIJ Statute based upon its status as a party to the Treaty
without having to establish an interest of a legal nature,2' the vessel
was destined for a Polish naval base.22 The case thus provides some
support for third state rights and duties. It was based upon the theory
that legal rights inure to the benefit of all parties to multilateral
treaties.
B. Post- World War II
As will be explained further below, one can find greater support for
third state rights and duties in events subsequent to World War II.
The United Nations Charter provides a role within the United Nations
system for third states in the enforcement of international law. In ad-
dition, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains a lim-
ited role for third states in the law of treaties. 23 The evolving
international law of human rights has promoted third state remedies,
and the ICJ has given some support to the theory. Writers and state
practice, however, provide uncertain support.
18. The S.S. "Wimbledon," 1923 P.C.I.J. (Set. A) No. 1.
19. Id. at 33. See South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 482, 502
(Mbanefo dissenting); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
12, at 468; P. VAN DIJK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE REQUIRE-
MENT OF AN INTEREST TO SUE 370 (1980).
20. The S.S. "Wimbledon," 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 1, at 21.
21. Id. at 13. See C.W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 524
(1964).
22. The S.S. "Wimbledon," 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 1, at 19.
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N.T.S.




1. The United Nations System
States may agree by treaty to permit third states to enforce rules of
international law. This may be accomplished by states acting unilater-
ally, or by actions taken pursuant to collective decisions. The United
Nations Charter established a role for third states acting collectively
with regard to certain violations of international law. 24 In some cases
the members of the Security Council may become involved when they
respond collectively to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or
acts of aggression by states.25 The Charter recognizes the right of
states to respond to situations which may endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security by bringing them to the attention of
the Security Council.26 The moving state need not be a state with a
direct interest in the affair.2 7 The Charter also authorizes the Security
Council to take enforcement actions when a state fails to perform its
obligations arising under a Judgment of the ICJ if enforcement is re-
quested by the prevailing state.28 The measures decided upon by the
Security Council may impose obligations on other states party to the
Charter.2
9
Similarly, the members of the General Assembly ("UNGA") act-
ing collectively by resolution may make recommendations on a variety
of subjects.30 The UNGA has made some use of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution 3t in specific disputes. Its actions with regard to the Middle
East, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Korea, Afghanistan, and the
Congo stand as further examples of third party efforts to enforce inter-
national law. 32 Such collective decisions directed towards enforcing
and promoting international law are supported by the international
community. Unfortunately, their record of success is qualified, at
best.33 Regional organizations may play similar roles, but neither is
24. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 U.S. Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S. No. 993
[hereinafter U.N. Charter].
25. U.N. Charter, arts. 39-50.
26. U.N. Charter, art. 35, para. 1.
27. Id.
28. U.N. Charter, art. 94, para. 2.
29. U. N. Charter, art. 25. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 at 52-55 [hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion].
30. U. N. Charter, arts. 10, 11, 13, 14.
31. G.A. Res. 377A, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. DOC. A/1775 (1950).
32. These efforts are summarized in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, AND H. SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1987), at 776-82 (1987).
33. M. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS, supra note 16, at 32-52. The most success has
been in the context of opposition to apartheid and colonialism for which there is a strong interna-
tional consensus. See id. at 142.
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their efficacy well established.3 4
2. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The International Law Commission ("ILC") addressed the rights
of third states to remedy law violations in the context of its work on
the law of treaties. 35 Would a party's breach of a multilateral treaty
constitute a legal injury to every other party? Could any party unilat-
erally invoke remedies in response to the breach? Some violations
might not tangibly injure all the parties, nor would they necessarily
infringe upon the full enjoyment of the treaty by every party. The ILC
treated the matter specifically and its approach was incorporated into
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.36 States that are di-
rectly injured in fact by the violation have certain unilateral rights.37
When the enjoyment of a multilateral treaty by all states parties would
be prejudiced by any party's breach, every party is injured and has the
right to take certain unilateral remedies. 38 In the case of treaties con-
cerning interests and rights that are less interdependent, those states
that are not specially affected may take remedial actions through col-
lective decisions by the non-breaching states parties. 39
The Vienna Convention took a conservative approach to the role
of third states in response to treaty violations. Some writers have sug-
gested that there remains an independent right under customary inter-
national law which permits unilateral reprisals by states party to a
multilateral treaty in response to a violation by another party. 40 It is
also maintained that under customary law a breach by any state party
to an international agreement constitutes an injury to the legal rights
of all parties regardless of whether they have suffered direct tangible
34. Id. at 53-87, 143-44.
35. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session,
(1966) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 226-30; Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, (Sir H.
Waldock, Special Rapporteur) (1966) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 51, 69-73.




40. Schachter, supra note 11, at 175-79; E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES,
supra note 11, at 92-93; Tanzi, Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an Interna-
tionally Wrongful Act?, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 30
(M. Spinedi & B. Simma eds. 1987)[hereinafter Spinedi & Simma]; Mazzeschi, Termination and
Suspension of Treaties for Breach in the ILC Works on State Responsibility, in Spinedi & Simma,
supra, at 57, 81-83; and Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 between
the United States and France, Award of December 9, 1978, 18 RPTs. INT'L ARB AWARDS 417,
443-46 [hereinafter Air Services Award]. The Preamble to the Vienna Convention, supra note
23, at 875, preserves applicable customary law not inconsistent with the Convention. See also




injuries.41 Consequently, every state party to a multilateral agreement
may have the right to take reprisals for a breach by any other party. A
right to take such actions under customary law does not appear to
have been precluded by the Vienna Convention.
The Vienna Convention promoted another development in the law
of third state remedies. The ILC made a considerable contribution to
the view that there are peremptory norms of international law (jus
cogens).42 Since these norms concern particularly important interests
of the international community, some maintain that bilateral remedies
for violations of such norms would not be sufficient. The duties to
abide by jus cogens norms may be owed to the entire international
community, erga omnes. As such, violations of some or alljus cogens
norms may be enforceable by states individually or collectively even in




Perhaps the principal substantive area ofjus cogens law is the inter-
national law of human rights, which has evolved substantially since
World War II. Not all human rights law is necessarilyjus cogens, nor
is that law necessarily erga omnes.44 It is clear, however, that much of
the international law of human rights would not be enforceable in the
absence of third state remedies. 45 The traditional international law of
state responsibility addresses the mistreatment of the nationals of one
state by another state. Human rights law has evolved to address the
mistreatment by a state of its own nationals. If third states have no
remedies for such violations, no enforcement would be possible by
state actors. Absent a remedy, such law may be a nullity. Fortu-
nately, it is clear that third states do have certain rights to respond to
violations of the international law of human rights. The extent of
those remedies, however, is not settled. Certainly, third states do not
41. See text accompanying notes 96-110; and S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 518-20 (1985).
42. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, arts. 53 and 64. Peremptory norms (jus cogens) are
fundamental legal obligations which, unlike other norms, may not be set aside by treaty. Such
norms include prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and piracy. See generally Gaja, Jus Cogens
beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 REC. DES COURs 271 (1981-111); C. ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT
OF Jus COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES (1976); J. SZTUKI, JuS COGENS AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, (1974).
43. The International Law Commission recognizes that there is a linkage betweenjus cogens
and erga omnes, but that they are not necessarily tied. Not alljus cogens rules are erga omnes,
nor are all erga omnes rulesjus cogens. 1976 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 102; and Meron, On
a Hierarchy, supra note 11, at 11.
44. Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 11, at l1-12.
45. See 1976 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 101-02.
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violate prohibitions on the intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of
states when they put pressure on alleged violators. Retortion may be
taken, and in some cases limited non-forceful reprisals and humanita-
rian intervention.
46
This enforcement may be predicated, however, upon the multilat-
eral treaty rule that all states have a legal interest in case of a breach
since virtually all international law of human rights is found in multi-
lateral agreements. Furthermore, there is a plethora of specialized ve-
hicles for collective decisions to enforce human rights norms.
47
Accordingly, third state remedies in cases of violations of human
rights law may not reflect the general application of third state reme-
dies under customary law.48
4. The International Court of Justice
The ICJ has not settled the question of third state remedies. In the
abstract, the Court has proclaimed the existence of rules of interna-
tional law owed erga omnes. But it has construed rather narrowly the
standing and other rights of third states whenever those rights have
been brought concretely to the Court.
a. Monetary Gold Case
The third state rights issue that arose in the Monetary Gold case
was not the subject of a judgment.49 The case does, however, provide
a basis for arguments in favor of third state enforcement of interna-
tional court judgments. As a result of the Corfu Channel case, the
Court determined that Albania had a duty to compensate the United
Kingdom for damages caused by exploding mines in the Corfu Chan-
nel. 50 Albania did not comply with the judgment. Subsequently, gold
46. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L.REv. 325,
332-38, 344-51 (1967); Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 at 32, 47;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec.
703(2), and reporter's notes 3, 4, 8, 9, & 10 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The case for humanita-
rian intervention by third states is argued strongly in Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Hu-
manitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 547 (1987).
47. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1986); Wes-
ton, Lukes, and Hnatt, Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 20 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1987).
48. Schachter, supra note 11, at 198. Treaties may give rise to customary international law
independent of the originating treaties. See Charney, International Agreements and the Develop-
ment ofInternational Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971 (1986).
49. The Court found that it had no jurisdiction in the absence of Albania. Case of the Mone-
tary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Questions)(Italy v. Fr., U.K. v. Ir., U.S.),
1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15, 1954) [hereinafter Monetary Gold Case].
50. Corfu Channel (Merits)(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
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apparently owned by Albania came into the possession of a post-
World War II Tripartite Commission composed of France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The Commission decided that the
gold should be given to the United Kingdom as a portion of the dam-
ages owed to it by Albania. This decision would be executed unless
Italy established that it had better title to the gold than Albania.
Certainly, if the gold were Albanian, the members of the Commis-
sion had a legal duty to deliver it to Albania. An exception to that
duty seems to have been justified as a reprisal for the Albanian viola-
tion of its own duty established by the earlier Judgment to compensate
the United Kingdom. The reprisal by the United States and France,
as third states, appears to have been based upon a claimed universal
right of all states to assist in the enforcement of judgments of the
ICJ.5 1 It represents state practice in support of the right of third states
to enforce ICJ judgments. 52 This right would appear to arise if a state
were to fail to abide by a judgment of an international court awarding
reparations in monetary form. Third states in possession of assets of
the recalcitrant state could tender those assets to the prevailing party,
or tender them to the Court for its disposition. 53
Unfortunately, in the instant case the Court refused to find juris-
diction in the absence of Albania since it was a directly interested
state. That determination stands as a serious obstacle to third state
enforcement through litigation in the ICJ. This obstacle certainly ex-
ists when, as here, the absent state's rights are the very subject matter
of the dispute and that state has chosen voluntarily not to join in the
action. 5
4
b. South West Africa Cases and Namibia Advisory Opinion
Considerable activity was spawned by the dispute over South Af-
rica's performance of its obligations required by the Mandate into
which it and the League of Nations entered concerning the manage-
ment of South West Africa (Namibia). The ICJ's involvement in the
matter has added to the literature on third state enforcement. Unfor-
51. This theory appeared to underlie the argument that Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice made to the
Court on behalf of the Commission. Monetary Gold Case, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings, 125, at 131.
See Akehurst, supra note 15, at 13-14.
52. Akehurst, supra note 15, at 13-14; Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial
and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. JOUR. INT'L L. 1 (1960). A detailed review of this matter is found
at S. ROSENNE, supra note 41, at 142-48.
53. Schachter has argued that the case supports this theory. Schachter, supra note 52, at 8-
12. See C.W. JENKS, supra note 21, at 703-06. Accord, "SOCOBEL" v. Greek State, 18 I.L.R. 3,
5-9 (Trib.Civ. de Bruxelles 1951).
54. S. ROSENNE, supra note 41, at 431; Chinkin, Third Party Intervention Before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 517 (1986).
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tunately, the ICJ has done little to clarify the situation. Three actions
by the Court bear on the subject: the 1962 Judgment on the Prelimi-
nary Objections in the South West Africa cases; 5 the 1966 Judgment
in the Second Phase in the same cases; 56 and the 1971 Advisory Opin-
ion the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Secur-
ity Council Resolution 276 (1970).1 7
In its 1962 Judgment, the Court found that two former members
of the League, Ethiopia and Liberia, had jurisdiction to bring suit
against South Africa with respect to South Africa's failure to carry out
its obligations under the Mandate. 58 Neither Applicant State alleged
that it had suffered a direct injury. Rather, the Applicants success-
fully alleged that, as former members of the League of Nations, they
had rights under the Mandate to sue for performance.5 9 The Court
emphasized that a sacred trust was held by the Mandatory, and that
the duties of the Mandatory had to be assured through judicial protec-
tion. The compromissory clause of the Mandate permitted any state
that had been a member of the League to bring suit against the
Mandatory to enforce the obligations of the Mandate. The Court
found that the scheme of the Mandate required this conclusion since
the League of Nations could not bring an action. 6°
By 1966 the composition of the Court had changed and a bare
majority of the Court appeared to back away from the broad recogni-
tion of the Applicant States' standing. While it did not expressly over-
rule the previous judgment, it held at the Merits Phase that the
Applicants had no legal rights for which they had the necessary stand-
ing to obtain a judgment against South Africa. While jurisdiction ex-
isted, standing was absent for the specific cause of action put forward.
In order to succeed on the merits before the ICJ, the Applicant States
were required to allege that their legal rights or interests had been
infringed. 61 It was argued to no avail that a contrary result was re-
quired by the interest of all states in the sacred trust that the
Mandatory held, and by the membership of the Applicant States in the
League of Nations under which the Mandate was established. Other
55. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary
Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 319 (hereinafter South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections].
56. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 6.
57. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 29.
58. South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, supranote 55.
59. Id. at 337-38, 347.
60. Id. at 336-38. See P. VAN DIJK, supra note 19, at 428-30.
61. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 18-26. See I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 12, at 469.
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arguments based upon necessity, since no other states would have
greater interests or stronger arguments for standing before the Court,
and upon the need to protect the human rights of the inhabitants of
South West Africa, also failed to sway the Court. 62 This judgment
appeared to mark a reaffirmation of the strict bilateral remedy rule of
international law.
Nothing in the Judgment, however, precludes states from entering
into international agreements that define legal rights broadly in order
to give states substantive standing, even in the absence of an actual
direct tangible injury.63 In fact, the Court made clear that legal rights
for these purposes are a function of the applicable international law.
Thus, it is conceivable that injury to the legal rights of otherwise disin-
terested third states could be found under specific rules of customary
international law. 64 To this extent, the Judgment is limited, yet it per-
mits the further evolution of the rule of third state remedies.
International reaction to the substance of the 1966 Judgment was
swift and clear in condemnation of the Court's action. Within four
months the United Nations General Assembly resolved to terminate
the Mandate. 65 In 1969 and 1970 the Security Council adopted reso-
lutions recognizing the termination of the Mandate and imposing
sanctions on South Africa.66 The request for the 1971 Advisory Opin-
ion sought ICJ advice on the binding legal effect of these United Na-
tions actions.67
This time the Court provided support for third state remedies in
international law, at least in the context of a collective decision by the
concerned community of states. The Court found that the sanctions
adopted by the Security Council were binding on all members of the
United Nations. Members of the United Nations were affirmatively
obligated to carry out the sanctions as established by the Security
Council and to avoid any action that would undermine their effective-
62. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 34-35, 47. Strong dissenting
opinions were filed by a number of judges. See, e.g. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase,
supra note 12, at 323 (Jessup, dissent). See P. VAN DIJK, supra note 19, at 430-37.
63. "[A] legal right or interest need not necessarily relate to anything material or 'tangible,'
and can be infringed even though no prejudice of a material kind has been suffered." South West
Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 32.
64. See id., at 32-34. See also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 469-70. In the Nuclear Tests
Cases the Court found that the French declaration created a duty to each state severally, Nuclear
Tests Case, (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 269-70; Nuclear Tests Case, (New Zealand v.
France), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 474-75.
65. G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
66. S.C. Res. 264, 24 U.N. SCOR at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev. 1 (1969); S.C. Res. 276,
25 U.N. SCOR at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).
67. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 29.
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ness. 68 The Court declared, in addition, that the obligations existed
for states not members of the United Nations: it was incumbent upon
non-members that they support these United Nations resolutions. If
they took actions incompatible with the resolutions, they would be
subject to counter-measures by the United Nations and its members.
69
While duties of the member states may have been derived from the
Charter, those of non-member states may be derived only from cus-
tomary international law. There was no suggestion that these reme-
dial actions could be undertaken only by states that were actually
injured by the illegal behavior of South Africa.70 It appears that the
collective decisions by the United Nations added legitimacy to the
measures, notwithstanding the fact that the United Nations lacks the
legal authority to directly impose legal obligations on non-member
states. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that necessity to pro-
vide a remedy for violations of international legal obligations affects
the availability of remedies under international law. 71 This advisory
opinion has been well received by the international community.
c. Barcelona Traction Case
Subsequent to the 1966 South West Africa Judgment but before
the 1970 Advisory Opinion, the Court addressed third state remedies
directly. In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court held that the Ap-
plicant State had no standing to bring suit in a dispute where it es-
poused the interests of nationals who were shareholders of a foreign
corporation. 72 The case provided the Court with another vehicle to
explore third state remedies, and it took the opportunity, perhaps to
limit the severity of its 1966 Judgment.
68. Id. at 55-56, 58. Schachter, supra note 11, at 184.
69. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 29, at 56, 58.
70. One possible interpretation of the 1966 Judgment and the 1971 Namibia Advisory Opin-
ion is that third states may not seek remedies unilaterally, but must do so through a collective
decision of an international organization. E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES,
supra note 11, at 115-17. Zoller agrees that this series of decisions need not be read to prohibit or
severely restrict third state remedies. Id.
71. The Court wrote: "As to the general consequences resulting from the illegal presence of
South Africa in Namibia, all states should bear in mind that the injured entity is a people which
must look to the international community for assistance .. " Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra
note 29, at 56. A similar interest supported the Court's 1949 Advisory Opinion on Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. It found that the United Nations had
the necessary legal personality to seek remedies for injuries to its agent. Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 177-80. Of course, there would
still remain the requirement in a judicial proceeding that the judgment could have a practical
consequence. Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons, (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Pre-
liminary Objections, 1963 I.C.J. 15 at 33-34.
72. Barcelona Case, supra note 12, at 3.
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In much-quoted dicta, the Court directly endorsed erga omnes ob-
ligations and third state remedies in certain situations:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the impor-
tance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
... Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary interna-
tional law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as
also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimina-
tion. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into
the body of general international law ... ; others are conferred by inter-
national instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character. 73
The Court's approach might appear to divide international law
into two classes, one only enforceable bilaterally and another enforcea-
ble bilaterally and by third states. But this language was not meant to
be definitive. Rather, it was generally descriptive of the division that
the Court saw in international law. 74
Later in the Judgment the Court explored its conclusion that the
Applicant State could not have standing. The discussion provides fur-
ther insight into the considerations that led the Court to the view that
in the instant case standing was limited and bilateral. This examina-
tion helps to define those rules that may be enforceable by all states. It
was critical to the Court that the injured corporation was a national of
a state which did exist and which was capable of seeking a remedy. 75
The language of the Court suggests that if there had been no such
state, or if that state had been precluded from exercising its legal rights
by forces beyond its control, the Applicant State might have succeeded
in its efforts to gain standing. 76 Thus, necessity was an important con-
73. Id. at 33.
74. In his separate opinion, Judge Riphagen was critical of this a priori division. Id. at 340.
It appears to have broken down in the human rights area. T. MERON, supra note 47, at 188-89.
See generally, P. VAN DIJK, supra note 19, at 412-16.
75. Barcelona Case, supra note 12, at 44-45.
76. The Court wrote:
The Canadian Government has, nonetheless, retained its capacity to exercise diplomatic
protection; no legal impediment has prevented it from doing so: no fact has arisen to render
this protection impossible. It discontinued its action of its own free will .... This cannot be
regarded as amounting to a situation where a violation of law remains without remedy: in
short, a legal vacuum. There is no obligation upon the possessors of rights to exercise them.
Sometimes no remedy is sought, though rights are infringed. To equate this with the crea-
tion of a vacuum would be to equate a right with an obligation.
Id. See also id. at 48; Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, id. at 171-82; Separate Opinion of Judge
Ammoun, id. at 319-20.
The necessity of a viable remedy played a more central role in the Reparations Advisory
Opinion where that element provided the foundation for the Court's determinations that the
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sideration in the Court's determination that the Applicant State had
no standing. Absent necessity, the Court was reluctant to endorse a
situation that would permit "competing diplomatic claims [which]
could create an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity."
77
d. Intervention Cases
The intervention cases before the Court have presented other situa-
tions in which third state remedies have been implicated. The Statute
of the ICJ, like that of the PCIJ, provides for two categories of inter-
vention. One is available when "the construction of a convention [to
which the intervening state is a party] is in question. 78 The other is
available when a nontreaty state "has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case."' 79 The Court has
construed both provisions rather narrowly. 0 This suggests that the
Court is reluctant to expand the ability of states to involve themselves
in the disputes of others.
The recent failed attempt of Malta to intervene in the Tunisia/
Libya Continental Shelf Boundary case8' and a similar failure of Italy
to intervene in the Malta/Libya Continental Shelf Boundary case
82
illustrate the point. In both cases intervention was sought on the
ground that areas that appeared to be subject to boundary adjudica-
tion also had been claimed by the states seeking intervention. The pe-
titioners alleged that the adjudications might prejudice their
continental shelf interests and might present obstacles to the resolu-
tion of disputes they had with the litigating states. The Court defined
narrowly the subjects of the cases limiting them to the disputes be-
tween the states parties. 83 In its judgments the Court did, however,
United Nations had both the capacity to make the international claim and the right to bring the
specific claim. 1949 I.C.J. 177-80.
77. Barcelona Case, supra note 12, at 49. It distinguished the multiple claimants situation
from the case presented when an agent of an international organization is injured on the ground
that in the latter case the number of claimants would necessarily be small and their identity
would be easily determined.
78. I.C.J. Statute, art. 63.
79. I.C.J. Statute, art. 62.
80. Chinkin, supra note 54, at 511-12, 531. See also, Damrosch, Multilateral Disputes, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 376 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987); Fitz-
maurice, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice 1951-4. Questions of Jurisdic-
tion, Competence, and Procedure, 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 124-26 (1958).
81. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1981 I.C.J. 3 (Application by
Malta for Permission to Intervene) [hereinafter Application by Malta].
82. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) 1984 I.C.J. 3 (Application by Italy
for Permission to Intervene) [hereinafter Application by Italy].




seek to avoid pronouncing on the boundaries in areas known to be
claimed by the states denied intervention. It also acknowledged the
sensitivity of the third state question by referring expressly to the in-
tervention decisions.
8 4
As mentioned above, the recent Nicaragua case concerned third
state remedies under international law.8 5 The matter arose with re-
gard to El Salvador's attempt to intervene in the litigation. That effort
at the Jurisdiction Phase was summarily denied.86 The issues arising
in the litigation concerned the performance of a variety of multilateral
treaties to which the United States, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were
parties. Many of the alleged illegal uses of force by Nicaragua took
place within the territory of El Salvador, or constituted threats to its
territorial integrity and political independence. As in the maritime
boundary cases, the Court narrowly construed the scope of interven-
tion under the ICJ Statute and summarily dismissed the request. The
Court implicitly took a narrow view of third state remedies, at least
with regard to questions of jurisdiction.8 7 The Court left open the
question whether at the Merits Phase intervention would be permitted.
Arguably, third state interests relate to the substantive issues and not
to those of the Court's jurisdiction. Discouraged by the peremptory
disposition of its request, however, El Salvador did not press the mat-
ter at the Merits Phase.
e. Nicaragua Case, Merits
At the Merits Phase of the Nicaragua case, the Court refused to
uphold the legality of the United States' unilateral use of force in re-
sponse to Nicaragua's alleged attacks on other Central American
States. Although the Court recognized the existence of the right of
"collective self-defense against an armed attack, ' 88 it held that the
84. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 91, 94; Continen-
tal Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 26. Similar results were found in
previous cases. In Haya de La Torre (Columbia v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, the Court did permit
intervention, but subject to significant limitations on the subjects that the intervening state could
address. Id. at 77. Fiji's requests to intervene in the Nuclear Tests cases were deferred until the
Court ruled upon jurisdiction. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1973 I.C.J. 320 (Application
by Fiji for Permission to Intervene); Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), 1973 I.C.J. 324
(Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene). Ultimately, the cases were dismissed as moot
and the applications to intervene were dismissed. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1974
I.C.J. 530 (Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene); Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v.
France), 1974 I.C.J. 535 (Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene).
85. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
86. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador) [hereinafter
Declaration of El Salvador]; Chinkin, supra note 54, at 509-14, 531.
* 87. Chinkin, supra note 54, at 511-13, 531.
88. Nicaragua Case, Merits, supra note 1, at 109-110. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, supra
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United States actions were illegal because it found that Nicaragua had
not committed an armed attack against other Central American
States. This finding was based upon an analysis of the only available
evidence of Nicaragua's behavior.8 9 The conclusion was supported by
the observation that prior to the United States' intervention, the
targets of the alleged Nicaraguan attacks failed to assert that an armed
attack had occurred, nor had they requested United States assistance
to repel the Nicaraguans. 90 By this analysis, the Court found that a
request by the state target of the armed attack to the third state is a
prerequisite to third state intervention by collective self-defense. 91
While the Court did provide support for third states actions in the
face of an armed attack, it suggested that third states may not have the
independent right to collective counter-measures involving the use of
force. 92 It concluded the discussion of this matter with dicta that also
note 24, preserves the right of collective self-defense. This customary law right permits third
states to take action in response to an armed attack on another state. Akehurst, supra note 15, at
4; J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 245 (1954).
89. Nicaragua Case, Merits, supra note 1, at 119-21. The United States refused to participate
at the Merits Phase. This may have contributed to the failure of the evidence in this regard.
Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 116 (1987); Highet, Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 30-42,
49-51 (1987); Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court, in THE ICJ
AT A CROSSROADS 288, 291 (L. Damrosch ed., 1987).
90. Nicaragua Case, Merits, supra note 1, at 119-21.
91. Id. at 103-05, 119-21, 127. In the past, third states have obtained such invitations in
order to provide a legal basis for the intervention. For example, requests were made, albeit not in
the absence of pressure from the requested states, in the recent interventions in Afghanistan, and
Grenada. See generally L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 155-57 (1979); Schachter, The
Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.REv. 1620, 1644-45 (1984); Moore, Grenada and
the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984). The Governor-General's
request to the United States in the Grenada intervention has been debated. ECONOMIST, March
10-16, 1984, at 34. Similar questions have arisen in the case of the Afghani invitation to the
Soviet Union. A. ARNOLD, AFGANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION IN PERSPECTIVE (rev. ed.
1985); Brezhnev's Report To Congress - I, Pravda, Feb. 23, 1981, at 2, translated in 33 CDSP, No.
8, at 3, 7. Bishop supported the view that the lawful and established government could invite a
third state to help put down disorders and rebellions. He recognized, however, the difficulties of
this view. Bishop, General Course of Public International Law, 1965, 115 REC. DES COURs 147,
440 (1965-II).
It is not unusual to find third state assistance of states claiming the right of self defense. In
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom, the United
Kingdom received support from the United States and the European Community. See Doxey,
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 15 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 273, 283-
85. In the Iranian hostages dispute the United States obtained the assistance of segments of the
international community in support of its claims that the Iranian actions violated international
Law. See id. at 279-80. Doxey does argue that third state actions and those of the U.N. have not
been terribly effective. Id. at 278, 286-87; and M. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS, supra
note 16, at 142-48 (1987). See also, G. HUFHAVER & J. Scorr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECON-
SIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 79-92 (1985). Lauterpacht wrote that collective "self
defense is a proper expression of the ultimate identity of interest of the international community
in the preservation of peace." L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-56 (H. Lauterpacht,
7th ed. 1952).
92. Nicaragua Case, Merits, supra note 1, at 127.
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forbid third state counter-measures in the absence of a request from
the victim state when another state provides support short of armed
force for revolutionary groups operating in the victim state.93 It did
not foreclose third state counter-measures in other situations not in-
volving the use of force. 94 The Judgment, however, is highly
controversial.
The Court supported its conclusion that the United States actions
violated international law upon the finding that the alleged exercise of
self-defense was not accompanied by notification to the United Na-
tions Security Council. 95 Since the United States multilateral treaty
reservation precluded application of Charter obligations, the Court
based this consideration on customary law. Failure to resort to avail-
able mechanisms for collective decisions apparently will weaken, if not
destroy, a case for third state remedies.
In sum, the ICJ has provided only qualified support for third state
remedies. It has allowed that legal rights may be defined broadly, even
to the extent of acknowledging legal rights owed to all the world, erga
omnes. The availability of third state remedies may be enhanced if
there has been a resort to the community's mechanisms for collective
decisions. No judgment, however, has resulted which has provided
definitive support for third state remedies. If the Nicaragua case is
any guide, third state remedies by the use of force may be prohibited
even in the face of a prior illegal use of force, even in the face of an
aggression, and even if there has been a violation-of ajus cogens norm.
State practice related to matters before the Court provide support for
third state remedies, especially when preceded by a Court judgment,
or a collective decision of the interested community.
5. Writers
a. In General
Third state remedies have received only limited attention by writ-
ers. The paucity of attention may reflect negatively upon such reme-
dies. Increased attention, however, has been seen in recent years. Not
surprisingly, those that have addressed the matter are in disagreement.
None provide strong support for wide ranging third state remedies.
93. Id. Unfortunately, the theoretical foundations for this and other customary law conclu-
sions are questionable. No supporting evidence of state practice was identified in the Judgment.
Charney, Customary International Law in the Nicaragua Case Judgment on the Merits, I HAGUE
Y.B. INT'L L. 16, 19 (1988).
94. Nicaragua Case, Merits, supra note 1, at 27; See also id., Dissent of Judge Schwebel, at
361-62.
95. Nicaragua Case, Merits, supra note 1, at 105.
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Writing in 1970, Akehurst argued that third state reprisals are and
should be available under customary international law only in three
limited areas: enforcement of judicial decisions, breaches of multilat-
eral agreements, and violations of rules prohibiting or regulating the
use of force. 96 Akehurst opposed other third state reprisals on the
ground that the risks to international relations would be greater than
the benefits. 97 He was unable to find state practice to support third
state reprisals except with regard to the three categories. 98
Brownlie also appears to be cautious about third state remedies.
He has acknowledged that legal interests could attach to cases of in-
tangible interests and to actions by some third states. 99 He has, how-
ever, not supported the ILC efforts to establish an international
criminal law enforceable erga omnes. Nor has he found support for
erga omnes and third state enforcement under the doctrine of humani-
tarian intervention. 100
Tunkin has supported third state remedies in the circumstances of
breaches of the peace, threats to breach the peace, acts of aggression,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and colonialism. 101 Jessup sup-
ported third state remedies under broader, but limited conditions
where the protection of the general interests of mankind were found to
be at stake. He focused upon genocide, apartheid, the global environ-
ment, ocean resources, and the Constitution of the International La-
bor Organization.
10 2
Meron has found support for erga omnes treatment of interna-
tional human rights law, and perhaps other, but not all, rules of inter-
96. Akehurst, supra note 15, at 15-16. The first is justified on the ground that once the
judgment is reached by an unbiased court the risk of abuse would be limited. The second is
limited by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requirement that all such remedies be
adopted by the unanimous collective decision of the non-breaching parties. The third is required
because the fundamental purpose of international law is to limit or prevent war. Id. at 16-17.
While Akehurst uses the term "reprisals," the article is relevant to a wide variety of responses to
violations of international law.
97. Id. at 17.
98. Id. at 2-3, 6, 14-16. But see id. at 15 n. 2.
99. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 467.
100. Id. at 512-13; I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, PART I 33 (1983); Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN IN-
TERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, at 147-48 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
101. G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 415-425 (1974); G.I. TUNKIN, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: PROBLEMS THEORIQUES 220-24 (1957). The views of other socialist
authors are summarized at 1976 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 115; and Tanzi, supra note 40, at
18-19 nn. 65-66.
102. Dissent of Judge Jessup, South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 323,
373-74, 441 (Judgment of July 18); Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, South West Africa cases,
Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 387, 425-33; Jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of
Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L. L. 341 (1964); and Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1973).
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national law found to be jus cogens.10 3 Similarly, the American Law
Institute's Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States found erga omnes obligations in a few areas such as
human rights law, the law of the sea, and international environmental
law.t°4 Weil has expressed serious doubt concerning the role of third
state remedies in international law, especially those based upon erga
omnes.'0 5 Zoller is cautious, but not necessarily as hostile.106
Schachter is circumspect; in his opinion, the strongest case is found
in the field of human rights.'0 7 Although he is unable to find a case in
which a third state has predicated a reprisal strictly on the basis of
erga omnes, he does identify modern situations in which third states
have taken counter-measures in the nature of retortion against states
accused of violating fundamental rules of international law.' 08 In
some situations third states may be obligated to "join in measures
against an offending government."' 1 9 He believes many of the areas in
which erga omnes might be applied could be included within the nar-
rower rule that all states parties to an international agreement have a
103. T. MERON, supra note 47, at 187, 189; Meron, supra note 11, at 1, 11-12.
104. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, introductory note to Part VI (marine environment); Sec-
tion 514, Comment f; Section 703 reporters' notes 3 (human rights); Section 901, reporters notes
1; Section 902, reporters notes 1 (1988). The Chief Reporter was Louis Henkin. The three
Associate Reporters were Andreas Lowenfeld, Louis Sohn, and Detlev Vagts. See Schachter,
supra note 11, at 195-96.
105. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 431-
33 (1983).
106. Zoller is skeptical about liberal application of the erga omnes theory. The weak interna-
tional legal system might not support an enforcement system that closely approaches the punitive
model of more advanced legal systems. E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES, supra
note 11, at 37-38, 52-53, 114-17. Zoller does find evidence of third state enforcement in the
domestic legislation of the United States. E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION 67-68 (1985) [hereinafter E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW]. Such United States enforcement is legislatively authorized in situations where
other states violate obligations under treaties to which the United States is a party even in the
absence of injury to the United States. Id. at 69-72. Enforcement is similarly authorized in cases
of other states' violations of non-treaty based obligations with respect to human rights, hijacking,
terrorism, and certain other international crimes. Id. at 10 1-26. Of course, it should be pointed
out that legislative authority does not automatically translate into action. Implementing regula-
tions, rules of construction conforming them to obligations under international law, and Execu-
tive discretion will limit the application of these statutes. Sanctions under international law, she
argues, are required to be remedial and not punitive. E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL
REMEDIES, supra note 11, at 54-55, 57-59; E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra, at 146-56. Although she does recognize a role for third state remedies she is cautious lest
they approach the punitive model. Id. at 105-08, 114-17. She is particularly skeptical about the
ILC effort to promote international criminal law. E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REME-
DIES, supra note 11, at 59-60.
107. Schachter, supra note 11, at 192-93, 195-96, 201, 342.
108. These actions took place in the context of the interventions of the U.S.S.R. in Afghani-
stan and Poland, the Falkland/Malvinas situation, and the Tehran hostages situation. Id. at 183-
84, 197.
109. Id. at 184.
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legal interest in its performance.110 The multilateral convention rule
would apply to the United Nations Charter with its broad coverage of
the use of force, human rights, and state responsibility, as well as the
many human rights and law of the sea agreements that are now in
force or may in the near future be brought into force.
b. The International Law Commission
Perhaps the most significant support for wider use of third state
remedies may be found in the work of the ILC on the Law of State
Responsibility. Such remedies may be available in regard to rules de-
rived from multilateral treaties, customary international law, and in-
ternational crimes."' The approach of the ILC to third state
enforcement has varied over the years. The 1976 ILC Report gave
strong support to erga omnes over a wide range based upon a review of
the history of state responsibility." 2 More recently, the Special Rap-
porteur took a more limited view of erga omnes, and appeared to limit
third state remedies to international crimes where such actions are au-
thorized by collective decisions. 1 3 The Draft Articles on the subject
are capable of either construction, but appear to follow a middle
course. It should be noted, however, that the Draft makes clear that it
is not comprehensive. Alternative and supplementary rules of state
responsibility found in customary international law and specific inter-
national agreements may be applicable despite their omission from the
draft.' 14 Since a new Special Rapporteur has been selected recently,
110. Id. Rosenne also has maintained that all parties to a treaty have a legal interest and a
right to bring an action before the ICJ. S. ROSENNE, supra note 40, at 520. See also, South West
Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J. 485, 502 (Mbanefo, J., dissenting); id. at 475, 478 (Forster, J.,
dissenting).
111. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Seventh Session (6
May 2-26 July 1985), 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.10) U.N. Doc. A/40/10, reprinted in [1985]
2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 19-27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinaf-
ter 1985 ILC Report]. SPINEDI AND SIMMA, supra note 40, examines aspects of the ILC work on
this subject. An extensive bibliography of other writings in the general area is included with the
book. The studies contained in the Spinedi and Simma book were written prior to the adoption
of the current draft of Article 5 examined below. Gray has criticized the work of the ILC on this
subject as too theoretical and not properly founded upon state practice. Gray, Is there an Inter-
national Law of Remedies?, 56 it. 1985 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 25, 26.
112. 1976 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 101-120.
113. Fourth Report on the Content Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility (Part 2
of the Draft Articles), by Mr. Willem Riphagen, Special Rapporteur, [1983] 2(1) Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 13-14, 21-22 [hereinafter Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur]. See also, Sixth
Report on the Content, Forms and Decrees of International Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft
Articles) and "Implementation" (Mise en Oeuvre) of International Responsibility and the Settle-
ment of Disputes (Part 3 of the Draft Articles), by Mr. Willem Riphagen, Special Rapporteur,
[1985] 2(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3, 5-8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/389 [hereinafter Sixth Report of
the Special Rapporteur].
114. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 1985 ILC Report, supra note 110, at 24-25, arts. 2-
4 [hereinafter 1985 Draft Articles].
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the future direction of the ILC work on this matter is not clear.
The Draft's definition of the "injured State" is central to the ques-
tion of third state remedies. Article V of the Commission's 1985 Draft
Articles on the Law of State Responsibility, Part II, defines the "in-
jured State" which would have rights to seek remedies under interna-
tional law. 1 5 The remainder of the draft sets out the remedies
available to "injured States" and the conditions upon which those
remedies may be pursued.
"Injured States" include parties to bilateral treaties, parties to
binding decisions of dispute settlement organs and of international or-
ganizations, as well as third states that are the beneficiaries of treaty
provisions. In addition, the draft sets out situations when violations of
multilateral treaties and customary international law may give rise to
"injured States":
(e) if the right infringed by the act of a State arises from a multilateral
treaty or from a rule of customary international law, any other State
party to the multilateral treaty or bound by the relevant rule of custom-
ary international law, if it is established that:
(i) the right has been created or is established in its favour;
(ii) the infringement of the right by the act of a State necessarily
affects the enjoyment of the rights or the performance of the obligations
of the other States parties to the multilaieral treaty or bound by the rule
of customary international law; or
(iii) the right has been created or is established for the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.' 
16
This draft article, which has been provisionally adopted by the
ILC, applies to norms established either by multilateral treaties or by
customary international law. It is nowhere specified that the "injured
State" must be a party to the multilateral treaty. Nor is it required
that the state which has been injured by a violation of a norm of cus-
tomary law have suffered a tangible injury.
115. 1985 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 25. See also Sixth Report of the Special Rap-
porteur, supra note 113, at 4-15. It was pointed out at the ILC that this is a non-exhaustive
definition of the term. The operative language is "In particular, 'injured State' means ......
Summary Records of the 1929th Meeting, [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 308, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SR.1875-A/CN.4/SR.1939 (Statement of Calero Rodrigues, Chairman of the Drafting
Committee). Furthermore, in regard to a specific infringement, a state may be an "injured State"
under more than one category of Article 5. Summary Records of the 1901st Meeting, [1985] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.1875-A/CN.4/SR.1939 (Statement of Mr.
Riphagen, Special Rapporteur).
116. 1985 Draft Articles, supra note 114, art. 5.2.(e), at 25. In the case of parties to multilat-
eral treaties, this provision appears to be more restrictive than intervention before the Interna-
tional Court. The ICJ and the PCIJ statutes appear to predicate the right to intervene on party
status only. This Draft requires that party status alone is not sufficient to designate a state as an
"injured state" for that purposes'. Of course, the ICJ has applied intervention restrictively. See
supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
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In 1983 the Special Rapporteur expressed the view that within the
context of Article 5(e) he knew of no substantive right under custom-
ary law which permitted third states to enforce a rule erga omnes. He
allowed that such rules may evolve in the future.1 17 One must assume,
therefore that the injured states identified in this provision are the ben-
eficiaries of the primary legal relationships that may be breached.
1 18
This theory is certainly stretched to the limit in subsection (iii) where
every state is an injured state if infringements of human rights and
fundamental freedoms have occurred. 1 9
Subsection (f) of this Article addresses collective interests, includ-
ing objective regimes. It states that an "injured State" status arises:
(f) if the right infringed by the act of a State arises from a multilateral
treaty, any other State party to the multilateral treaty, if it is established
that the right has been expressly stipulated in that treaty for the protec-
tion of the collective interests of the States parties thereto.' 2°
117. He wrote, "[I]t would seem that, beyond the case of international crimes, there are no
internationally wrongful acts having an erga omnes character." Fourth Report of the Special
Rapporteur, supra note 113, at 13.
118. Id.
119. See generally, 1976 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 109-10; 1985 ILC Report, supra note
11, para. 22 at 27. "The term "human rights and fundamental freedoms" is here used in the
sense which is current in present-day international relations." 1985 ILC Report, supra note I11,
para. 21, at 27. Meron has interpreted an earlier version of this provision as applying to all
human rights obligations regardless of importance. Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 11, at 12.
He takes the view that categorical distinctions among human rights norms cannot be supported.
Such rights may be created by treaty or customary international law. Summary Records of the
1929th Meeting, [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 305, 309, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985
(Statement of Mr. Calero Rodrigues, Chairman of the Drafting Committee).
Subsections (i) and (ii) do not as clearly provide other categories of legal rights that may have
the practical effect of erga omnes. These provisions are based upon comparable provisions in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but are made applicable also to customary law.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, arts. 35, 36, and 60; 1985 ILC Report,
supra note 110, at 26-27; Preliminary Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of International
Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility) by Mr. Willem Riphagen, Spe-
cial Rapporteur, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt.2 at 107, 120, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/330.
[hereinafter 1980 Preliminary Report]. The Special Rapporteur suggested a narrow interpreta-
tion of perceived erga omnes obligations. Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note
113, at 13-14, 21-22. But these subsections may be given broad effect that may, in the case of
specific substantive rules, provide for erga omnes enforcement. Certainly, a customary law or
treaty based norm could be "created" or be "established" in "favour" of all states. Equally an
infringement of a norm by a state could be deemed to "affect the enjoyment of the rights or the
performance of obligations of" all other states.
120. 1985 Draft Articles, supra note 114, at 25. For discussions of the objective regime issues
and erga omnes in the context of Antarctica, see Charney, The Antarctic System, supra note 10, at
63-83; Simma, Le Traitd Antarctique: Crde-T-il un regime objective ou non?, in Francioni and
Scovazzi, supra note 10, at 137; and Simma, The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing for an
Objective Regime, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189 (1986). Objective regimes are discussed at Report
of the International Law Commission to the Work of Its 35th Session, [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N pt.2, at 1, 41 U.N. Doc. A/38/10.
The interests of the international community in the world's commons quickly come to mind.
Many of those interests are the subject of multilateral agreements on the oceans, outer space,
Antarctica, and the environment. They can be said to have established norms for the benefit of
all states. Infringement of those norms may, as well, affect the enjoyment of the rights of all
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This area of third state remedies appears to be limited, requiring a
treaty regime and a stipulation for the protection of collective inter-
ests. It is established, however, that the entire article does not pre-
clude the application of rules of customary international law which
may provide for the protection of collective interests, even though
such interests would not be included within subsection (e). 121 The
scope of the term "collective interests" is, however, not settled. The
records of the ILC suggest that it may have a broad application. 122
states. The same could be said of the norms established by the United Nations Charter. Such
interests would be more specific than the broader interests of all states in the general effectiveness
of rules of international law. Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 113, paras. 115-
18, at 21-22. Some have suggested that these broader interests may form the basis for seeking
international remedies. See, e.g. Root, supra note 14, at 7-10; E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NA-
TIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 3 (1916). The Special Rapporteur acknowledged
this argument, but suggested that the line could be drawn between those matters which directly
injure specific states and more remote injuries. Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra
note 113, at 13-14, 21.
121. 1985 ILC Report, supra note 111, para. 25, at 27; Fourth Report of the Special Rap-
porteur, supra note 113, at 21-22. Summary Records of the 1929th Meeting, supra note 120, at
309.
122. Mr. Ogiso has expressed concern about the scope of "collective interests" and the likeli-
hood that defining it would give rise to disputes. Statement of Mr. Ogiso, Summary Records of
the 1896th Meeting [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 121,122, U.N. Doc. ACN.4SER.A1985.
The ILC Commentary to subsection (f) observes that the doctrine of the common heritage of
mankind found in the deep seabed regime of the Law of the Sea Convention represents a case
where collective interests exist. 1985 ILC Report, supra note 111, para. 23, at 27. The LOS
Convention provides that "the Area and its resources are the Common Heritage of Mankind."
and that "all rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole .... Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), pt. XI, arts 137, 137.2. It provides that the International
Seabed Authority shall act on behalf of all mankind. Id. art. 137.2. Specific remedial procedures
are also established. See, e.g. id. arts. 186-191. At no point does the Convention provide individ-
ual states with rights in the deep seabed Area that may be enforced against infringement by any
state. Nevertheless, the Article 5(f) collective interests are said to be present in the deep seabed
Area, giving all states parties the status of "injured States" in cases of violation. In 1985 the
Special Rapporteur expressed the view that the collective interests requirement also would be
met in the cases of the EEC, ECSC, EURATOM, and the Hague Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. Statement of Mr. Riphagen, Summary Reports of the 1901st
Meeting, [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 153, 157, U.N. Doc. ACN.4SER.A1985.
Third state remedies might also be established if the substantive treaty contains a general
reference to the interests of the community or state parties. This is possible despite the absence
of correlative third state substantive or procedural rights or duties, and in the face of specific
remedial provisions that do not provide for third state remedies. Such a rule could support third
state rights in a wide variety of situations. One might consider whether the maintenance of the
freedom of the seas presents a situation in which the collective interest of all states would justify
third state remedies in the case of infringements upon those freedoms. The United States actions
in the Persian Gulf would appear to be based, at least in part, on this theory. See Reagan's News
Conference on Domestic and Foreign Matters, supra note 5, at A8, col. 1 (National Ed.). The ILC
Rapporteur has not supported this view. See Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note
113, at 14 n. 42. See also, 1980 Preliminary Report, supra note 120, para. 72-73, at 121-22.
Today, of course, the LOS Convention is not in force and some states may never be parties to
it, but most, if not all, members of the international community recognize that the Area is the
common heritage of mankind and that certain norms attach to the Area notwithstanding the
status of the Convention. Perhaps, at present, violations of those norms would establish all states
as "injured States" under Article 5(e)(i) or (ii). This view was supported in the ILC by Mr.
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The last category of third state remedies considered in the ILC
Draft arises in the context of international crimes. The ILC has been
at the forefront of efforts to define and promote public international
criminal law. The Draft states: "3. In addition, 'injured State'
means, if the internationally wrongful act constitutes an international
crime [and in the context of the rights and obligations of States under
articles 14 and 15], all other States."'
123
The ILC and its Special Rapporteurs have been squarely behind
the erga omnes status of international crimes 24 on the ground that in
cases of international crimes all states have an interest in their sup-
pression. 2  The ILC has not defined those actions that would be clas-
sified as international crimes. The Draft does, however, provide
specifically that "aggression entails all the legal consequences of an
international crime."' 26 The work of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind may bear on the definition of intertational crimes for the
purpose of State Responsibility. 27  Consequently, the international
Njenga. Summary Reports of the 1896th Meeting, 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 121, 123-124, U.N.
Doc. ACN.4SER.A1985.
123. 1985 Draft Articles, supra note 114, art. 5.3 at 25.
124. 1976 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 101-02, 109-10, 121; Fourth Report of the Special
Rapporteur, supra note 113, at 11-14; 1985 ILC Report, supra note 111, paras. 27, 28, at 27.
125. Summary Records of the 1866th Meeting, [1984] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 308, 313,
U.N. Doc. ACN.41366; Fourth Report by the Special Rapporteur, supra note 111, at 12.
126. 1985 ILC Report, supra note 111, art. 15, at 21 n. 66.
127. These two subjects technically are distinct because the law of state responsibility ad-
dresses the responsibility of the state as a legal entity, while the subject of offenses against the
peace and security of mankind addresses the responsibility of individuals. See Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1985] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 63, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/387 [hereinafter Draft Code on Peace and Security]; Summary Records of the
1897th Meeting [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 4, U.N. Doc. A39439 [hereinafter Summary
Records of the 1897th Meeting]. They do, however, address similar, if not related, behavior
viewed as particularly important to the international comrtxunity.
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind may be defined rather broadly:




Any internationally wrongful act which results from any of the following is an offense
against the peace and security of mankind:
(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding
international peace and security;
(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding
the right of self-determination of peoples;
(c) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding
the human being;
(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safe-
guarding and preservation of the human environment.
Second alternative
Any internationally wrongful act recognized as such by the international community as
a whole is an offense against the peace and security of mankind.
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crimes included in Article 5.3 of the Draft on State Responsibility may
very well cover serious violations of norms prohibiting aggression,
colonialism, apartheid, genocide, and damage to the environment.
1 28
It does not appear, however, that all breaches of jus cogens rules are
considered to be international crimes by the ILC.
t29
The draft recognizes that "injured States" may seek international
remedies against the infringing state or states. The remedies may,
however, be limited. Such states would have the unconditional right
to seek a return to the status quo ante.130 If corrective actions prove
impossible, the injured state may seek compensation in monetary
form. ' 3 ' Reprisals in the form of the suspension of legal obligations by
the injured state towards the infringing state'3 2 would be conditioned
upon the following:
1. an exhaustion of available dispute settlement procedures,' 33 except
in the case of interim measures;'
34
2. proportionality; 35
3. as required by applicable multilateral conventions the authorization
of the remedy by collective decisions;
136
4. avoidance of prejudice to the rights of other states under applicable
conventions and rights of natural persons protected by international
law; 137
5. not violating peremptory norms and the immunities of diplomatic
persons or other government officials;' 38 and
6. conformance with restrictions found in multilateral agreements, un-
See Draft Code on Peace and Security, supra.
In this context the Special Rapporteur has included in the definition such actions as aggres-
sion, the threat of aggression, the perpetration of aggression, interference in the internal or exter-
nal affairs of states, terrorism, obligations assumed under certain treaties, colonial domination,
mercenarism, and economic aggression. See Third Report by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Draft Code on
Peace and Security, supra.
128. It must constitute a particularly serious breach of public international law. 1976 ILC
Report, supra note 15, at 101-02, 109-10, 116, 121. Mr. Ogiso has questioned how the organic
international community can determine which acts may be international crimes. He does not
believe that the United Nations has the authority to define international crimes. Statement of
Mr. Ogiso, Summary Records of 1896th Meeting, supra note 128, at 122. Special Rapporteur
Riphagen considers international crimes as constituting a limited exception to bilateral enforce-
ment of international law. Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 113, at 11-12. See
Mohr, The ICJ's Distinction Between "International Crimes" and "International Delicts" and its
Implications, in Spinedi & Simma, supra note 40, at 126-29.
129. 1976 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 120. See also id., at 102.
130. 1985 ILC Report, supra note 111, at 20, n.66, art. 6.
131. Id. arts. 6.2 & 7.
132. Id. arts. 8 & 9.
133. Id. art. 10.1.
134. Id. art. 10.2.
135. Id. art. 9.2.
136. Id. art. 11.2.
137. Id. art. 11.1. See Schachter, supra note 11, at 180.
138. 1985 ILC Report, supra note 111, at 21, n.66, art. 12.
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less they are made inapplicable by a collective decision of the parties or
by severe violations of such agreements.
1 39
In accordance with the Draft, if an international crime were com-
mitted, every state would be obligated to support enforcement actions
by others and to avoid supporting the violator. Thus, all states would
be obligated to take a "non-neutral position" in response to interna-
tional crimes. 140 Third state responses to such crimes would be car-
ried out under the auspices of the United Nations, but only when the
machinery for such collective action was available. 141
Some fear has been expressed at the ILC that third state remedies
may be abused. Accordingly, collective decision requirements and
limitations on the remedies available to third states have been included
in the Draft. 142 These limitations, however, are not mandatory in all
cases of third state remedies. 143 Third party dispute settlement, collec-
139. Id. arts. 11.2 & 13.
140. Id. art. 14.2. Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 113, at 11-12; 1980
Preliminary Report, supra note 120, at 120-21.
Despite the obligation of every state to take a "non-neutral position," all states may not have
the "same right of response." Those rights may be "graduated according to the seriousness of
the infringement of the right or interests in each case." Statement of Mr. Calero Rodrigues
(Chairman of the Drafting Committee), Summary Records of the Meetings of the 37th Session,
[1985] U.N. Doc. at 309.
The duty of third states to take a "non-neutral position" may not be limited to international
crimes. 1980 Preliminary Report, supra note 120, at 121.
141. 1985 Draft Articles, supra note 114, art. 14.3. See Fourth Report of the Special Rap-
porteur, supra note 113, at 11-12. But it is clearly understood that the right of self defense to an
armed attack would not be predicated upon a prior collective decision. Id. at 10. See 1985 Draft
Articles, supra note 115, art. 10.2(a), at 20. Furthermore, not all agree that the UN would have
the authority to take collective decisions on enforcement actions with respect to all international
crimes. See, Statement of Mr. McCaffrey, I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 98; Statement of Mr. Ogiso,
id., at 122.
142. See 1980 Preliminary Report, supra note 120, at 122; Summary Records of the Meetings
ofthe36th Session [1984] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 313, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366 & Add.l/ 1984;
Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 113, at 21-22. See also, Schachter, supra note
11, at 201.
143. Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 112, at 16. It is not clear whether
or not the ILC Rapporteur, Mr. Riphagen, sought to compel collective decisions in all cases of
third state remedies. At times, it has appeared that the collective decision requirement was non-
derogatable. Id. at 18, 21-22, 121-23. See Mazzeschi, supra note 40, at 84-85; Malanczuk, Coun-
termeasures and Self-Defence as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in Spinedi & Simma, supra note 40, at 234.
Such institutional requirements are designed to thwart abuses by third states of erga omnes en-
forcement. Alland, International Responsibility and Sanctions: Self-Defense and Countermea-
sures in the ILC Codification of Rules Governing International Responsibility, in Spinedi &
Simma, supra note 40, at 189.
In his 1986 Report on State Responsibility, the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Riphagen, proposed
machinery for third party dispute settlement in order to avoid abuses. Seventh Report on State
Responsibility [1986] U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/397, (by Willem Riphagen, Special Rapporteur) [here-
inafter Seventh Report of the Special Rapporteur].
Schachter has expressed concern that third party standing to bring claims to international
courts may make states reluctant to give their consent in advance to jurisdiction before such
tribunals. Schachter, supra note 11, at 201.
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tive decisions under special international agreements, and United Na-
tions decisionmaking become necessary only when they are available
and effective.144 Few of the ILC's limitations on third state remedies
would be unavoidable. Such remedies would have to be consistent
with norms relating to proportionality, human rights, peremptory
norms, and diplomatic immunities. 145  Thus, third state enforcement
of international law norms may be readily available under the instant
ILC draft in a wide variety of cases. 146
The above analysis, however, may be overdrawn. The ILC Draft
could be construed merely to refer back to the substantive law to de-
termine whether the substantive law creates legal rights and duties en-
forceable by third states. ' 47 Perhaps a better view of the current Draft
would be that the ILC would establish that appropriate norms of in-
ternational law may be enforceable by third states. Only a redefinition
of the legal rights and injuries arising from substantive norms consis-
tent with traditional international law would put these tools into use.
Nevertheless, the ILC Draft does provide support for third state en-
forcement, and erga omnes. It goes beyond the limited rules identified
by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case. This support is based upon
a genuine desire to promote the rule of international law, particularly
in important areas where violations are likely and enforcement is
weak. The work of the ILC may facilitate the expansion of third state
remedies.
c. Conclusion
The above discussion establishes that states not tangibly injured by
a breach of international law may take remedial actions, at least under
144. See supra note 141.
145. Mr. Ogiso expressed concerns about the wide latitude provided in the cases of breaches
of multilateral treaties. [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 311.
The Special Rapporteur has maintained that reprisals consisting of breaches of rules protect-
ing the human environment, "seem to be inadmissible." Although, he would distinguish between
affirmative actions constituting a breach and the non-performance of obligations. Fourth Report
of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 113, at 17.
146. The term "erga omnes" is absent from the draft since the Special Rapporteur under-
stood that members of the ILC felt that it did not take into account the "distinction between the
directly and indirectly affected States." Statement of Mr. Riphagen (Special Rapporteur), [1985]
1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 157. This concern is not incompatible with third state enforcement.
To the extent included within the draft articles, third state enforcement rights may not be as
extensive as those of directly injured states. It would appear that the current draft makes few
distinctions of this nature.
147'. The International Law Commission appears to recognize the fact that the definition of
the "injured State" is tied to the substantive norm. 1985 ILC Report, supra note 111, at 26.
Some have suggested that this is the proper interpretation of the ILC drafts. In fact, however,
the drafts themselves seek to establish that certain classes of norms have erga omnes characteris-
tics even in the absence of direct proof that a norm has so evolved. See Gray, supra note 111, at
26.
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some circumstances. This is accomplished when a state becomes an
injured state as a matter of law. A treaty may establish specific legal
rights of parties or non-parties. Customary law may establish the legal
rights of all parties to a treaty, and duties under customary law may be
owed to all states, erga omnes. Treaties may authorize states to take
remedial actions vis-a-vis parties, including the invocation of third
party dispute settlement procedures, and sanctions may be authorized
by collective decisions. Customary law may also provide for such
remedies, especially in the case of international crimes.
III. ISSUES
Once the existence of third state remedies is acknowledged, the
issues surrounding their use can begin to be defined. Although there
are some inherent problems and possibilities for misuse of the doc-
trine, there are also some limitations possible which might strengthen
it.
A. Inherent Problems
States are certainly free to agree among themselves to third state
enforcement by treaty, inter se. More difficult is third state remedies
in response to violations of customary law only. The law may permit
third state remedies as a consequence of liberal definitions of legal
rights and duties, i.e. erga omnes, or liberal constructions of the reme-
dial system. The scope of such remedies may vary depending upon the
specific remedy to be taken and upon procedures necessary to invoke
such remedies. Such third state remedies, however, do present a vari-
ety of difficulties.
1. Injuries
The prior discussion clearly establishes that traditional interna-
tional law does not require that the injury suffered that would give rise
to a right to seek a remedy be a direct physical or economic loss. It
could merely be a damage to the legal rights of the complaining
state. ' 48 As a consequence, one could consider third state remedies to
be based upon a mere redefinition of the substantive legal rights and
duties of states. 149 As such, these remedies would represent no radical
148. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 32-33. See Seventh Report of
the Special Rapporteur, supra note 144, at 16-17; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 472-73;
Schachter, supra note 11, at 192-93; Statement of Mr. Riphagen, Special Rapporteur, [1985] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 87. Nor does international responsibility depend upon a finding of fault.
Schachter, supra note 11, at 189; Seventh Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 143, at 17.
But it may be required by the substantive norm. Causal connection is required. Id.
149. The International Law Commission has recognized the fact that the definition of the
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change from traditional views of international remedy law. One
could, on the other hand, take the position that such developments,
while technically unexceptional, actually undermine the very essence
of the traditional injury requirement. Consequently, they would rep-
resent significant diversions from traditional views.
The real problem created when the injury requirement is relaxed,
or eliminated altogether, is the risk that states would abuse their
rights. Such states might use the third state remedy as an excuse to
injure an adversary by taking actions in the absence of a violation, or
when such intervention would be unnecessary. 50 A conservative defi-
nition of injury and a requirement that the acting state have directly
suffered the injury limit the potential for abuse. The international
community should be wary of rules that may increase, rather than
decrease conflict and discord.
2. Remedial Purposes
In her study of countermeasures, Zoller argues that remedies
under international law may be corrective only and may not be puni-
tive. Punitive remedies would suggest the superiority of the punishing
state over the alleged violator that would be inconsistent with the sov-
ereign equality of states. Only in mature legal systems with central-
ized governing systems is punishment of subjects acceptable. Since the
international legal community has not so evolved, remedies under in-
ternational law are limited to the promotion of corrective measures.
The remedies must be reversible at the time that the illegal situation is
corrected.' 5 ' While all might not agree with each of Zoller's conclu-
sions, it is clear that remedies directed towards the promotion of cor-
rective behavior are most desirable. 52 They limit the risk that the
dispute will expand undesirably. Third state enforcement of interna-
"injured State" is tied to the substantive norm. Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-Seventh Session, [1985] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
25-26 (Part II). See Seventh Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 144, at 17.
150. See Akehurst, supra note 15, at 15-17; Schachter, supra note 11, at 184.
151. E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES, supra note 11, at 37-38, 52-55, 57-
60, 72-73, 105-08; E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 106, at 146-56.
Zoller writes that even the decisions of the U.N. Security Council are limited to corrective action.
E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES, supra note 11, at 69-71. Similarly, reprisal
and reparation rules are driven by the concept of correction rather than punishment. Limita-
tions, such as the rule of proportionality, seek to effectuate this objective. Id. at 15, 52-53, 57-58.
She prefers to use the terms "reciprocity" and "equivalence" to convey the same meaning.
Schachter appears to agree with Zoller's general thesis in this regard. Schachter, supra note 11,
at 171.
152. Alland interprets the work of the ILC as supporting the view that sanctions under inter-
national law may be punitive, Alland, supra note 144, at 174-75. Alland opposes the use of
sanctions and countermeasures as punishment. Id. at 176.
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tional law need not be punitive in nature. It may, however, take on
many punitive characteristics, and thus be undesirable - if not con-
trary to established law.
In the absence of a tangible injury, the complaining state may not
be able to suggest to the accused state a course of behavior that would
be corrective. As a consequence, actions taken by third states might
have punitive impacts only. Sensitivity to the need for a remedial pur-
pose has been demonstrated by the ICJ. In the Northern Cameroons
case the Court declined to act because no conceivable court order
could correct the alleged delict. 15 3 The Court has issued declaratory
judgments, as in the Corfu Channel case.' 54 Such judgments have
been rendered, however, when a directly injured state has been a party
and when the declaration could encourage the party at fault to take
remedial actions. 55 The same may not necessarily be true in some
third state enforcement situations. Certainly, the calculation and dis-
position of reparation by restitution or indemnity would be difficult. ' 56
While a third state might have a legal right that would give it standing
before an international tribunal, it may not be able to obtain a judg-
ment on the merits in its favor if no judgment could remedy the situa-
tion. It is not necessarily true, of course, that third state remedies
taken to enforce a rule of law require that all third states have standing
to bring suit in an international court as an actio popularis. 1 5 7 Nor
may such states have the right to take every specific remedy that might
be available to a directly injured state.
3. Containment
For reasons of containment, classical international law tends to
limit the remedies available to directly injured states. While violations
of international law may be disruptive to international relations, some
remedies may be equally if not more disruptive. Thus, the rule of pro-
portionality assures that the remedy would not be so disproportionate
153. Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15 (Prelim-
inary Objections of Dec. 22, 1963) at 33-34. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12,.at 472.
154. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (April 9, 1949).
155. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, the Court declared the law.
Afterwards, the parties negotiated a settlement of their ocean boundary dispute based upon the
Judgment. Some have focused on the question of whether a specific affirmative remedy was
requested or whether reparations in the form of monetary compensation might be available. I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 471-72; Statement of Mr. Roukounas, [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 140.
156. Weil, supra note 105, at 432-33.
157. Standing before the ICJ need not be the same as standing to seek remedies outside of
court.' S. ROSENNE, supra note 41, at 374-75, 518-20; Schachter, supra note 11, at 201, 342.
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to the delict that the remedy would exacerbate the situation.' 5"
Traditional international law of third state neutrality is another
situation in which international law contains conflicts, even though
one state may be in the wrong and involvement by others might facili-
tate effective law enforcement. Auto-enforcement by the international
community presents a serious risk that the conflict would expand.
The third states actions may reflect bias or be based upon the mistaken
belief that the law has been violated. 15 9 Containment through neutral-
ity may be preferable to additional international conflict through
expansion. 1
60
Further expansion risks arise when a state is the object of a remedy
and claims the right to engage in remedies in response. If third states
were able to take remedial actions against a state that allegedly vio-
lated the law, the alleged violator might take counter actions and ex-
pand the conflict further.
16
Another expansion problem posed by third state remedies involves
the relationship of the third state to innocent states. In bilateral rem-
edy situations a breach may relieve the injured state of the duty to
perform a legal obligation owed to the breaching state.1 62 That release
may not operate to affect the injured states' obligations towards other
states. This limitation is difficult in bilateral situations. It becomes
even more difficult if a third state takes action. In the case of third
state remedies, limiting the secondary effects of a release from legal
obligations owed to the breaching state may not be accomplished
easily.
An equally important aspect of the containment issue concerns the
interest of the directly involved state. That state may not want third
states to become involved in its relations with the alleged violator. It
may prefer to have complete control over such bilateral relationships.
158. Air Services Award, supra note 40, at 444-45; Akehurst, supra note 15, at 15-17; Weil,
supra note 105, at 431-33; E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES, supra note 11, at
15, 52-53, 57-58. See also 1980 Preliminary Report, supra note 120, at 127. The requirement that
remedies be ratione materiae serve a similar containment purpose. See E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 106, at 152.
159. In the absence of a violation, international law may not permit remedial actions. Thus,
international law may be violated if a state purports to take remedial actions when there has not
been an actual violation in the first place. Schachter, supra note 11, at 171.
160. Akehurst, supra note 15, at 15-17. Bishop suggested that the whole concept of neutral-
ity may not be viable under the United Nations system. It appeared to be predicatedupon the
assumption that all states would be involved in the maintenance of peace. Bishop, supra note 91,
at 449. °
161. Wengler, Public International Law: Paradoxes of a Legal Order, 158 REC. DES COURS
9, 23-24 (1977 V); Seventh Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 143, at 6-7.
162. This might not be appropriate in the case of human rights obligations and jus cogens
norms.
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The directly injured state may never seek to remedy the violation of its
rights, it may delay pursuing a remedy, or it may join the grievance
with other aspects of the relationship with the alleged violator. Even
though the third state may act to benefit the directly injured state,
third state involvement may limit the directly injured state's options.
Such results may not be appreciated. Community interests certainly
should predominate over bilateral relations if they are to justify third
state involvement in what are essentially bilateral relationships. That
explains why third state enforcement is most favorably considered in
the context ofjus cogens norms. Otherwise, the interest of contain-
ment argues against third state remedies.
4. Confusion
A final problem raised by third state remedies is the possibility that
confusion may result. If multiple states exercise rights to engage third
state remedies, settlement of the dispute may be difficult. 63 Would
each enforcing state have to be satisfied with the remedial action ten-
dered by the accused state? If all are not satisfied, how would a final
resolution of the dispute be reached? If a judgment were entered be-
tween the accused state and one or more enforcing third states, would
it be binding on all other actual or potential third state enforcers? To
whom would reparation be directed?
64
This review of the significant problems inherent in third state en-
forcement of international law argues in favor of caution. While third
state remedies may not be inappropriate, it is clear that such remedies
should be available under restricted conditions.
B. Limitations
1. Remedy Choice
A variety of limitations may be placed upon third state remedies.
It is not necessary, for example, that third states have the right, much
less the duty, to invoke all the remedial tools available to a directly
163. The problem of confusion created by multiple states having the right to seek interna-
tional remedies was one of the reasons why the ICJ did not favor the standing of the stockhold-
ers' state of nationality in the Barcelona Case, supra note 12, at 49-50. Previously, in the
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Advisory
Opinion, April 11, 1949), the Court had indicated that this was a concrn. Nevertheless, it found
that the United Nations could bring the claim. Id. at 185-86. In Barcelona the Reparations
opinion was distinguished on the ground that claims of the United Nations would be limited in
number and easy to resolve.
164. See South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, supra note 12, at 319, 552 (Joint Dissenting
Opinion of Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice).
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"injured state" under international law.165 Reparation or standing to
bring suit in the International Court might be rarely appropriate reme-
dies. 166 Some remedies might be unavailable to third states. 167 On the
other hand, less difficulty may be created in cases of droit du regard,
retortion, diplomatic protests, and cooperation with states having the
primary right to take remedial actions. Too many restrictions may
nullify the effectiveness of third state enforcement; too few restrictions,
however, may permit third state remedies which cause more difficul-
ties than they solve. Fashioning a regime that will strike the proper
balance and avoid unworkable complexity may be difficult indeed.
2. Collective Decision
Another potential limitation on third state remedies would require
a collective decision by the relevant international community to au-
thorize the third state actions. Thus, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties calls for a collective decision by the non-breaching
parties in the case of certain violations of multilateral conventions. ' 68
The ILC Draft on the Law of State Responsibility sets out a similar
collective decision provision in the cases of international crimes, viola-
tions of multilateral treaties, and objective regimes.' 69 The ICJ ap-
165. Meron recognizes that the identity of the appropriate remedies available for third states
is not settled. Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 11, at 11-12.
166. Variations in the rights of states to seek remedies is discussed at 1976 ILC Report, supra
note 15, at 112-13. See also, Seventh Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 143, at 17;
Statement of Sir Ian Sinclair, [1984] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 303-304, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366.
Jim6nez de Ar6chaga has defined reparation as the "generic term which describes the various
methods available to a State for discharging or releasing itself from ... responsibility [for injuries
caused by a breach of an international obligation]. The forms of reparation may consist in resti-
tution, indemnity or satisfaction." Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, International Law in the Past Third of
a Century, 159 REC. DES COURS 1, 285 (1978 - I).
Reparations in the form of payment of money or transfers of property would present great
difficulties if they were to go to third states. The management of such reparations to benefit other
states could be difficult indeed. A declaration of illegality, however, would not present the same
difficulties. Some would consider such declarations to be reparations. Tanzi, supra note 40, at 21-
22.
The 1985 Draft Articles 6 and 7 provide for monetary reparations in favor of the injured state
if the wrongdoer has not reestablished the status quo ante. In Court monetary reparations, how-
ever, are unusual. Gray points out that the PCIJ and the ICJ have assessed damages in two cases
only, although they were requested in about one-third of the cases. The two cases, the Wimble-
don and Corfu Channel cases had unusual features. Gray, supra note I 11, at 36. The Interna-
tional Court has not developed a discrete jurisprudence on the assessment of damages. Id. at 39.
Currently, the ICJ is about to consider the request reparations in the Nicaragua case.
167. 1985 Draft Articles, supra note 114. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12 at 472-73; Fourth
Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 113, at 13-14.
168. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 60, para. 2(b). See, Fourth Report of the Special
Rapporteur, supra note 113, paras. 50, 58-63 at 10 & 12. See also Bazyler, supra note 45, at 602.
169. 1985 Draft Articles, supra note 115, at arts. 10 & 11. See Fourth Report of the Special
Rapporteur, supra note 112, para. 115, at 22. This idea is derived from the ICJ's reliance in the
Advisory Opinion in the Namibia case on the decision of the U.N. Security Council. 1980 Pre-
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pears to favor third state remedies taken in the context of collective
decisions.' 70 This approach is driven by the concerns addressed
above. Confusion, conflict, and difficult remedy decisions arise when
multiple enforcement agents are free to act unilaterally. Since third
state enforcement reflects community interests, the community in
question should respond collectively to the breach. Unilateral third
state remedies may be impermissible.
In a mature legal system a collective decision rule might be com-
mendable. For the instant situation, the requirement may not be ap-
propriate. Unrealistic expectations about the role to be played by
international institutions in the enforcement of international law could
lead to poorer, rather than better, enforcement of important substan-
tive norms. 17 1 Furthermore, it is not clear that there is a forum avail-
able to take action in the case of all potential situations. 172 The United
Nations Security Council is available in cases of threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and disputes likely to en-
danger the maintenance of international peace and security.1 73 Its ju-
risdiction, however, is not exclusive, nor is it all-encompassing. What
functioning organs for collective decisions are really available in cases
of genocide, other violations of human rights laws, violations of the
laws of the sea, and violations of international environment law? The
General Assembly may have some role, but it, too, is neither exclusive
nor comprehensive. 174
In the case of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of
aggression, the United Nations Security Council is vested with certain
liminary Report, supra note 119, para. 74, at 122. See E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL
REMEDIES, supra note 11, at 105-08.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71 and 95.
171. It is doubtful that the international community would tolerate a powerful central au-
thority to coerce obedience to the law. Schachter, supra note 11, at 167. Zoller considers the
bilateral remedy system of international law fundamental to the rudimentary legal system. Col-
lective decisions to remedy violations might be supplemental to bilateral remedies, but could not
replace them. The idea that remedies in cases of the most important violations would require a
collective decision is "quite astounding" and runs counter to "common sense." E. ZOLLER,
PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES, supra note 11, at 112, 114, 117. See also Weil, supra note
105, at 431-33.
172. The Special Rapporteur often seems to make this assumption. See supra note 144.
173. U.N. Charter, supra note 24, art. 39. E. ZOLLER, PEACTIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES,
supra note 11, at 111-12, 115-17; Statement of Mr. Ogiso, [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 122,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.382.
174. U.N. Charter, supra note 24, arts. 10-16. E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REME-
DIES, supra note I1, at 1 1 1-12, 115-17 (1984); Statement of Mr. Ogiso, supra note 174, at 122.
Malanczuk, supra note 144, at 235-38, reaches the conclusion that a decision on a dispute by an
international organization would satisfy the obligation even if it were not legally binding so long
as it was not ultra vires. Mohr, supra note 129, at 137, agrees that in the absence of an appropri-




enforcement jurisdiction. 175 Unfortunately, even its effectiveness is
questionable. In many important cases the veto rule176 has prevented
effective actions. Studies of collective enforcement by the United Na-
tions and other groups of states have documented the limited effective-
ness of international institutions in such situations. 77 Under current
conditions, a collective decision requirement could eliminate the possi-
bility of third state remedies in many areas and make effective reme-
dies unlikely in others.
3. Community Interests
Another restriction might limit third state enforcement to a spe-
cific list of international law norms. The listed norms would be those
that the community considers to be so important to the international
community as a whole that effective enforcement by third states would
be desired despite the difficulties created by such enforcement. Unfor-
tunately, identifying those substantive norms may be insurmountable.
This problem is best illustrated by the inability of the community to
designate all but a very few peremptory norms (jus cogens) of interna-
tional law. 178 If the international community were to identify certain
norms or situations as extremely important to the international com-
munity as a whole, and if it were to tie remedies to an ineffective pro-
cedural system, the result might, unfortunately, obstruct the
promotion of the very objectives that it would purport to promote.
4. Problems With Limitations
Balancing the interest in the rule of law through effective enforce-
ment and the problems inherent in third state enforcement is not easy.
This has been most pointedly expressed in the context of the debate
over the proper role for erga omnes in international law. Weil, for
example, has expressed grave reservations with regard to third state
enforcement of international law norms. He has argued in favor of the
traditional bilateral enforcement mechanisms of international law:
Like thejus cogens doctrine and the theory of international crimes, [erga
omnes] is inspired by highly respectable ethical considerations. Yet, here
too, subjects of doubt and perplexity come crowding in.
This is so, in the first place, because it is no easier, of course, to iden-
175. U.N. Charter, supra note 24, arts. 39-49, at 1043-44.
176. U.N. Charter, supra note 24, art. 27.
177. M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, supra note 16, at 142-48; M.S. DAOUDO & M.S.
DAJANI, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 159 (1983). It has been suggested
that states which are merely reciprocating for injuries done to them are not acting within any sort
of legal, philosophical order. N. ONUF, REPRISALS: RITUALS, RULES, RATIONALES 11 (1974).
178. Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 11, at 13-16.
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tify obligations erga omnes than peremptory norms or essential obliga-
tions. Even if the number of obligations erga omnes is in principle to
remain small, the examples given by the Court [in the Barcelona Trac-
tion case] are still mere examples, and we are once more faced with a
category capable of an expansion all too likely to get out of hand....
But the prime source of perplexity lies in the ambiguity surrounding
the precise identity of the omnes to whom the obligations are owed.
Have the corresponding rights become vested in the "international com-
munity as a whole," or in each of its component states ut singuli? The
first alternative would imply the possession by the international commu-
nity of some organic representation capable of taking legal action for the
protection of its rights, which is certainly not the case. The second
would signify that any state, acting separately and on its own behalf,
could clearly claim the fulfillment of an obligation erga omnes and in-
voke the international responsibility of any other state committing a
breach of it. But then more questions arise. Is it contemplated that
there should be some reparation of the classic type? If so, it is hard to
see what injury would have been sustained by the applicant or what,
apart from a declaratory judgment, an individual constituent of the
omnes could claim. Is punishment envisaged? In the absence of any
judicial channels organized to that end, that would mean that any state,
in the name of higher values as determined by itself, could appoint itself
the avenger of the international community. Thus, under the banner of
law, chaos and violence would come to reign among states, and interna-
tional law would turn on and rend itself with the loftiest of intentions. 1
79
Responding to Weil's criticism, Schachter first acknowledges that
Weil's fears have a legitimate foundation. Schachter believes, how-
ever, that the international community will approach erga omnes in a
traditionally conservative manner and will avoid the difficulties sug-
gested by Weil. The potential benefits of enhanced obedience to im-
portant norms outweigh the limited risks.'
8 0
179. Weil, supra note 105, at 431-33. See also Marek, Criminalizing State Responsibility, 14
REV. DE BELGIUM DROIT INT'L. 460, 470-71 (1978-9); Dupuy, Observations Sur le "Crime
International de L'Etat", 84 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUB. 449, 463-67 (1980).
180. Schachter writes:
I would guess that they will do so infrequently and then almost always as a supplement to a
claim based on a legal interest derived from probable injury (as in pollution) or from partici-
pation in a relevant treaty (e.g., United Nations Charter or a human rights treaty). States,
by and large, are not inclined to open a Pandora's box which would allow every member of
the now numerous community of States to become a "prosecutor" on behalf of the commu-
nity in judicial proceedings. Even if a State should decide to be a "guardian" of interna-
tional law, there is no reason to assume that "chaos or violence" will ensue (as was
suggested by one eminent scholar).... On the affirmative side, there are surely advantages
in strengthening an awareness among States that the obligations of international law relating
to aggression, basic human rights, and the shared environment are of general interest and
common concern. This awareness may be given legal implementation by recognizing a droit
de regard that would permit States to express their concern regarding actions of others that
have adverse repercussions on the community and its system of norms. Carried further it
would be the basis of the actio popularis enabling a State to initiate judicial action in the
common interest.. Both of these legal concepts may of course be abused by individual States
acting for their own political reasons and it may be necessary to develop procedures in the





The shape of these developments is difficult to predict. No one
element will determine the future role of third state remedies under
customary law. The evidence suggests that the scope of legal rights
and third party remedies will depend substantially upon a variety of
factors. These include the scope of collective decision requirements,
the importance of legal norms to the community at large, the need for
effective enforcement vehicles, the risks that third state remedies
would produce undesirable consequences, and the nature of the spe-
cific remedies to be used, among others. The limited third state reme-
dies available under customary law and the uncertain role played by
erga omnes today, attest to the cautious approach taken by states.'
8'
As this law evolves, the limitations inherent in the international
legal system and the political context in which it operates will play
important roles. Since the international legal system is not a mature
and centralized one, the advanced enforcement systems of highly de-
veloped legal systems are not available. The bilateral remedial system
generally available to enforce norms of international law is not likely
to change. There may be, however, an appropriate albeit limited place
for third state remedies. Third state remedies involving any significant
intrusion into bilateral relationships between states may be desirable
only in the context of situations that are fundamental to the interna-
tional community, and then only when actual violations pose serious
threats which otherwise cannot be remedied. Only in such cases may
the difficulties presented by such third state remedies be overcome by
their potential benefits.
B. Situations Which May Be Appropriate for Third State Remedies
In that context, we could identify situations in which a bilateral
enforcement system may be particularly inadequate to meet the needs
of the inteknational society. Third state remedies may be most desira-
ble in those cases. One type of situation in which the need may arise is
when no directly injured state would have traditional standing to seek
a remedy. For example, this may be presented when a government
commits genocide against its own nationals, or when damages are
caused to common spaces outside of the jurisdiction of any state.
A second situation may be found even when there is a directly and
Schachter, supra note 11, at 200-01.
181. 1985 ILC Report, supra note I 1, paras. 27 & 28, at 27. A permissive third state remedy
system is not likely to develop, nor is it desirable at this stage of international law.
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severely injured state with a legal injury, but that state is incapable of
seeking a remedy due to reasons beyond its control. This may take
place, for example, in the case of aggression against a state which
places the target state under the effective control of the aggressor.
In a third situation there may be directly injured states with the
interest and ability to seek a remedy, but blatant and widespread viola-
tions of the law committed by a powerful state or group of states may
have created a situation such that the injured states alone are not able
to effectuate a remedy. 182
In all three situations the unavailability of an effective remedy
causes serious consequences justifying third state remedies. The viola-
tion of a particular important norm does not establish the appropriate-
ness of third state remedies. Under specific circumstances many rules
of international law; even ordinary ones, might justify such treatment.
In these cases the bilateral remedial system may be incapable of re-
sponding effectively to serious violations of the law which have com-
munity-wide consequences. It is in these cases that the international
community as a whole may have the necessary stake in the promotion
of obedience to the law. Third state remedies may be capable of meet-
ing these needs.
At the core is the view that third state remedies are exceptional
and are driven by necessity. 8 3 In the absence of necessity, the tradi-
tional bilateral system of remedies is likely to remain untouched. If
one of the situations like those identified above were to arise, a third
state may find that it has standing to seek remedies that would be
intrusive into otherwise bilateral relationships. Third states would
have the obligation to establish that a violation of the law has taken
place and that the condition of necessity does exist.
182. See Root, supra note 14, at 5-6. In support of third state recourse to force as collective
self-defense, Lauterpacht wrote, 'unless such right of collective self-defense is recognized the
door is open for piecemeal annihilation of victims of aggression by a State or States intent upon
the domination of the world." 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 91, at 156.
183. The necessity of a particular action is capable of judicial examination. Nicaragua Case,
Merits, supra, note 1, at 122-23. The reader will recall from the earlier discussionthat the ICJ
has previously addressed the necessity argument reaching differing results. See supra notes 54-76
and accompanying text. A teleological result in a particular case based upon necessity may be
rejected. The positive law may, however, evolve to permit remedies in particular cases of neces-
sity. In the Reparations Advisory Opinion the ICJ based its finding of United Nations capacity
to bring an international claim and right to bring the specific claim upon the fact that it was
essential to carrying out its responsibilities. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the United Nations, supra note 164, at 179-80, 182-84.
Of course, the procedural scheme to be discussed could be grafted upon each and every inter-
national norm that is a candidate for third state remedies. But at that point the distinction
between procedure an substance would be effaced. What is procedure but a general rule that may
be invoked in connection with a variety of norms under particular circumstances. Weil is con-
cerned that erga omnes presents special difficulties identifying the substantive norms and re-
straining states from abusing their third state enforcement rights. Weil, supra note 104, at 432.
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C. Procedure
In these situations, the relevant international community may have
the first opportunity to take collective decisions when the moving
party is a third state. Thus, the third state may be obligated to make
an effort to obtain the support of the interested community through a
collective decision. As reported above, however, there are precious
few institutions available with the authority and ability to resolve such
disputes. International organizations may have authority to discuss a
variety of matters and to adopt resolutions, but their determinations
may not be binding and are often not effective. Certainly, third state
remedies should not be tied irrevocably to these often ineffective pro-
cedural systems.
International organizations may, however, exert significant and de-
sirable influence on a violator and may help to shape the remedial
efforts even in the absence of the authority to issue compelling orders.
In general, a first resort to an appropriate international forum places
community restraints on abuses of significant third state remedies and
on potential violators when a remedy by the directly injured state is
unavailable. 184 Such a first resort may, however, be satisfied if this and
184. Article 10 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Part II would require the exhaustion of available international procedures for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes prior to the institution of forceful and non-forceful reprisals. 1985 ILC Report,
supra note Ill, art. 10, at 20 n. 66.
The United Nations Charter requires an exhaustion of such procedures only in the case of
situations that are likely to lead to threats to or breaches of the Peace. U.N. Charter, supra note
24, article 33.1, at 1042.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also requires the resort to a collective decision
of states parties in cases where there has been a material breach of a multilateral treaty and the
non-defaulting states seek to terminate the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art.
60.2(a), at 893. The Convention does not free the complaining third states from the collective
decision requirement if resort to such procedures proves futile. Exceptions to the collective deci-
sion requirement are provided only if suspension is sought by the specially affected party or by
other states in cases where the breach undermines the whole regime of the treaty. Id. art. 60.2(b)
& (c). See Report of the International Law Commission I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 253-55,
paras. 6-8.
The International Law Commission draft does not appear to limit its required collective deci-
sion process to those forums that would have the jurisdiction to compel remedial action. Draft
Articles on the Law of State Responsibility, supra note 143, art. 10.
In the case of international crimes, resort to a collective decision is specified in the ILC Draft,
supra art. 14, through the incorporation of the UN Charter obligations with respect to the main-
tenance of international peace and security. The United Nations obligation may be satisfied if the
efforts are exhausted. In the Nicaragua case the Court recognized a connection between the
customary international law of self defense and the United Nations Charter obligation to bring
the matter to the attention of the United Nations Security Council. Nicaragua Case, Merits,
supra note 1, at 105, para. 200. This would suggest that customary international law of interna-
tional remedies might appropriately include an obligation to make an effort to seek a collective
decision.
Zoller argues that as a matter of "principle ... there is no preliminary procedural condition
for the use of countermeasures by a state." E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES,
supra note 11, at 119.
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other efforts are exhausted without remedy or time constraints require
that action be taken first. 85 If these preconditions for such third state
remedies are met, the third state may have a strong basis for the uni-
lateral right to take such remedial action against the alleged violator.
D. Remedies
The extent of the remedies available to the third state, however,
still may not be identical to the remedies that may be available to a
directly injured state. Much depends upon the certainty of the viola-
tion, the nature of the violation, the risk to the international commu-
nity and to world order posed by the violation, the risks of injury to
the alleged violator and to other states, and the risks that the conflict
would expand undesirably as a result of remedial actions by the third
state.
Also relevant to the exercise of third state remedies may be the
relationship of the third state to the alleged violation. Up to this
point, we have assumed that there are two categories of states: states
which have suffered direct tangible injuries and third states. In any
situation, there may be many interested third states or there may be a
few. Some third states' interests may be remote and focus on general
systemic concerns. Others may be particularly interested due to their
proximity to the actors, or their practical stake in the outcome of the
matter.
While a division of third states into sub-classes may be difficult and
impracticable, the degree of the tangible interest that the state has in
the matter is relevant. The greater the interest, the closer the remedy
approaches the bilateral system and the less likely that severe manage-
ment problems may be presented. At some point, the interest of the
third state and that of a directly injured state approach each other.
86
This continuity between the interests of states is found also in the defi-
nition of legal interests. As discussed above, legal rights and duties
can be defined narrowly or broadly. Thus, the distinction between in-
jured states and third states is not clear cut. Consistent with this, rem-
185. Of course, the extent of the obligation to exhaust alternative remedies and to seek com-
munity action requires further elaboration to avoid abuses and inefficiencies. This idea is implicit
in the ICJ judgment in the Nicaragua case where it looked to determine whether the United
States brought the matter to the UN Security Council, notwithstanding the fact that the issue
before the Court related to customary law and not the law of the Charter. Nicaragua case, Mer-
its, supra note 1, at 105. See also, Bazyler, supra note 46, at 606-07.
186. Riphagen recognizes that the dividing line between injured states and third states may




edies available to states may not be based upon categorical divisions
between injured states and third states.
E. Conservative Growth
Certainly it is hard to predict how third state remedy law may
evolve. Since strong centralized institutions will not be established in
the near term, the system is likely to tolerate only the most limited
third state remedies. Those will be founded upon necessity and the
involvement of the concerned international community. Hard lines
and rules do not appear to be forming; rather, a balance is to be sought
among the relevant community and state interests.
In this regard, it should be noted that states are reluctant to use
their enforcement rights even in ordinary bilateral situations. Un-
remedied violations of public international law are all too common.
During the years since the ICJ declared the existence of erga omnes
and third state remedies, states have not made significant use of third
state remedies. All the evidence would suggest that states will con-
tinue to be extremely conservative in this regard. If anything, the facts
may justify some effort to encourage third state remedies in order to
make fully effective some important norms of international law.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, concerns about third state remedies under interna-
tional law are legitimate. State practice and opiniojuris do not clearly
support such remedies except under the most limited circumstances.
The practice is illustrated by the three situations set out at the begin-
ning of this article. Let us revisit them briefly in the light of the con-
clusions that have been reached.
In the Nicaragua case the ICJ addressed the United States third
state use of armed force against Nicaragua. The alleged Nicaraguan
behavior was grave, but the facts necessary to establish the allegations
were not presented, and the third state response (the use of armed
force) was the most severe. Other directly injured states responded to
the Nicaraguan threat by various means. Collective efforts, including
those through the Contadora process, had not been exhausted. There
was no widespread support in the international community for the
United States' actions. Consistent with the above analysis, the ICJ
condemned the unilateral third state remedy.
In the Persian Gulf a terrible war was in progress for several years.
The United Nations and regional groups unsuccessfully sought to stop
the war and to prevent injuries to neutral states. There is no dispute
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that the war caused direct injuries to the interests of the international
community in the Persian Gulf. Warnings were issued to no avail. As
a consequence, a few neutral states began to take defensive actions as a
last resort. These actions escalated and expanded to cover neutral
shipping under other flags only after repeated breaches of the combat-
ants' duties to avoid damage to neutral shipping. 8 7 The caution ex-
hibited by the third states, their first exhaustion of collective processes
at the United Nations and elsewhere, and their defense of collective
interests argues in favor of third state remedies in this situation.
8 8
Those remedies were supported by the general international
community.
In the Antarctic, enforcement of the norms has taken place within
the Antarctic Treaty system. States found to have violated the norms
have been placed under diplomatic and other pressure within the
Antarctic Treaty system. The Consultative Parties to the Treaty, the
primarily interested states, have acted collectively. Even efforts by
non-parties appear to have been subject to these pressures. 8 9 None
have argued that the third states did not have standing to encourage
lawful behavior. Recent efforts at the United Nations to establish a
broader base for the collective decision system are not incompatible
with the third state enforcement of the existing norms.190
In these three examples the community has taken a conservative
approach to third state remedies. As the international community ex-
plores third state remedies, it must reconcile the conflicting interests of
the international community.
At present, substantial support for a broad rule of third state inter-
national law enforcement does not exist. Actual state practice and
holdings of international courts on the subject are difficult to find. On
the other hand, legal interests have been broadly defined with respect
to parties to multilateral treaties. These definitions may produce a re-
sult that permits a wide range of third state enforcement under inter-
national law. A wider third state role would permit more states to
participate in the enforcement of norms for which increased conform-
187. Third state rights to remedy violations of the rights of neutral shipping have been advo-
cated in the past. See Naval and Aerial War, supra note 16, article 114.
188. Former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
Elliot Richardson have called for further collective measures through a United Nations
peacekeeping force that would provide neutral ships with escort and other services. A Proposal
for a United Nations Observer and Peacekeeping Mission in the Persian Gulf; Hearings Before the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 28, 1987, WASHINGTON WEEKLY REPORT
XIII-35 (30 Oct. 1987)(statements of Cyrus R. Vance and Elliot L. Richardson).
189. See F. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS at 115-116, 127, 128 (1982); and
Charney, The Antarctic System, supra note 10, at 75-76.
190. See Charney, The Antarctic System, supra note 10.
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ity may be sought. Despite the values of more aggressive law enforce-
ment, the international legal system might not tolerate a substantial
expansion of international law remedies to give third states a signifi-
cant role. Ultimately, such third state remedies might erode, rather
than enhance, obedience to the rule of law. At best, third state reme-
dies under customary international law may be appropriate in the case
of a few subjects of international law under limited circumstances.
The application of third state remedies to limited circumstances
only, and then subject to important but realistic procedural safe-
guards, may be evolving. Attention must be directed towards develop-
ments which permit the genuine interests of the international
community to be promoted without unacceptable costs. Under such
conditions, it is possible that third state remedies will expand in the
future.
